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USSR Report

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No. 6, June 1980



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WASHINGTON: TENSION-BUILDING

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[Article by G. A. Trofimenko]

[Text] There has been a clear shift in U.S. foreign policy from a course which to a certain degree was in conformity with the interests of maintaining detente to a policy of aggressiveness. Elements negative to the interests of international stability, which had been gradually accumulating in U.S. policy over the last several years, have finally diverted U.S. foreign policy from greater or lesser restraint to a policy of aggressive confrontation with the USSR and solution by military force. "It has become obvious that the present U.S. administration is pursuing a policy of undermining detente and aggravating the international situation," stated CPSU Central Committee General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev, chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in a speech to constituents on 22 February 1980. "The U.S. Government is attempting to dictate its will to the socialist nations and other countries."¹

Of course nothing unexpected has occurred in U.S. policy from the viewpoint of Marxist-Leninist theory of imperialism. As was noted at the 25th CPSU Congress, "if a real threat arises to the supremacy of monopoly capital and its political henchmen, imperialism pulls out all the stops, casting off any semblance of democracy. It is prepared to trample the sovereignty of nations and all legality, not to mention humanity."²

This shift in U.S. policy toward militarism and interventionism is now being explained away in Washington as being caused by the revolution in Iran and the events in Afghanistan. There also exists a slant in another direction: Some mass media see the President's campaign strategy as the main reason for this shift. They claim that the President, having detected a shift to the right in voter attitudes (unquestionably a shift resulting from protracted propaganda brainwashing of the population by political "hawks") and seeking re-election, is using the usual tactic of playing up to the mood of the moment. It is true that many observers believe that he is greatly overdoing this "playing up," taking risky and irresponsible steps in foreign policy for the sake of boosting his popularity.

Although both explanations contain some truth, in the sense that the above-mentioned circumstances have indisputably exerted, and continue to exert, a certain influence on White House decisions, the real reasons for the present shift in Washington's foreign policy should be sought in deeper-lying factors, connected primarily with the U.S. endeavor to impede and alter the process of sociopolitical change in the world, which is undermining the global positions of U.S. imperialism.

I.

The launching of the world's first artificial earth satellite in 1957 by the Soviet Union, which demonstrated the economic, technical and other successes of the USSR, the growing strength of the socialist community, the upsurge and victories of national liberation movements at the end of the 1950's produced a shock wave in U.S. ruling circles. At the beginning of the following decade they attempted to "get even" by proclaiming a new, vigorously interventionist foreign policy. John Kennedy, who entered the White House in January 1961, advanced the "New Frontiers" doctrine as an appeal to "expand the boundaries" of U.S. influence in all areas--by increasing U.S. economic and political influence on world affairs and stepping up the scientific and technological challenge to the Soviet Union. As was stated time and again at that time, the principal goal of the United States was to reestablish its "position of strength" in the world and to "turn back the tide" of revolutionary, national liberation movements from this new position.

Commencing his term in the presidency on 20 January 1961, John Kennedy proclaimed his formula for U.S. expansionism, which subsequently was widely publicized. He said: "We shall pay any price, we shall assume any burden, we shall endure any privation, we shall support any friend, we shall oppose any foe in order to ensure survival and the success of freedom."³ In other words, the United States set itself the goal of preserving the pro-American status quo in the non-socialist world and of strengthening its economic, military and political position as well as its role of leader in that world.

The U.S. ruling class, acting in conformity with this formula, placed upon the American people the financial burden of colossal military expenditures and the bloody burden of aggression in Indochina, but, as it turned out, by the end of the 1960's, under the influence of the defeat in Indochina and numerous other foreign policy failures, the U.S. ruling class agonizingly had to admit that the mission of world policeman, which it had imposed upon America, was beyond that country's capability.

The "Nixon Doctrine" was a comparatively realistic conclusion drawn by official Washington from the lessons of Vietnam and, in a broader sense, from an analysis of the new global balance of power, which had shifted away from the United States. Evaluating this doctrine in retrospect, one can state that, in spite of the endeavor to maintain what military-power position the United States still had, it proved to be the first and only

doctrine in a long line of U.S. doctrines proclaimed since World War II which postulated not stepped-up confrontation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries but a shift to negotiation with them, and acknowledged the fact that U.S. capabilities were limited in the area of shaping the international situation.

In his second inaugural address on 20 January 1973, Richard Nixon came right out and criticized the philosophy of his predecessors. "The time is past when America turned the conflicts of all other peoples into its own conflicts," he stated, "when it assumed responsibility for the future of all other countries and considered it a duty to point out to the people of other countries how to solve their problems."⁴ The U.S. willingness, which became apparent in the first half of the 1970's, to adapt to the new world situation and enter into a diversified, constructive dialog with the "potential adversary"--the Soviet Union--on the basis of acknowledgement of the strategic nuclear arms parity established between the two countries and the impossibility of building relations between them on principles other than those of peaceful coexistence.

But it would be a delusion not to see that, while the U.S. ruling class was willing to talk and negotiate agreements with the USSR and to promote detente, it did not abandon its basic goals and policy concepts; it was merely agreeing to change the forms of struggle with the USSR--to tone them down.

Even in its policy of detente, Washington stated for itself a number of objectives which, from the Soviet standpoint, have nothing to do with detente, and this naturally makes it necessary for the USSR to act in opposition to these goals even in times of active cooperation with the United States in a number of other areas. Along with its real attempt to avert a military clash with the USSR (undesirable for the U.S. ruling class under the conditions of the new balance of military power) and its intention to prevent the spread of nuclear arms, as well as its willingness to utilize more extensively the possibilities of international division of labor for mutually beneficial economic exchange, the U.S. Republican Administration was hoping to utilize detente to step up the ideological penetration of the socialist countries, to set them against each other, to lighten the U.S. foreign policy burden by playing a more sophisticated "balance of power" game, etc. Within that same negative plan, one of the important U.S. goals was Washington's attempt to draw the USSR and other industrially developed socialist countries into an aggravated "North-South" opposition (that is, the developed capitalist countries against the developing states) on a deideologized, apoliticized foundation, so to speak.

If this goal is achieved, according to U.S. theorists of the Henry Kissinger type, the United States would immediately accomplish a number of tasks: First of all, it would stabilize the status quo in the developing countries since it "would be guaranteed by two parties"--both West and East (the USSR), and since this status quo favors, in principle, the West

(because it preserves the position of the West in the developing countries) this will constitute stabilization under conditions benefiting the United States; secondly, the United States will be able to build a new world order based on consolidation of the unequal division of labor between the industrial "North" and the agrarian, raw-materials-producing "South," if not with the participation of the USSR on the side of the "South," then at least with its neutrality (since the Soviet Union would not want to "jeopardize detente with the United States"); thirdly, by dint of this development of events, the United States would be able to detach the USSR and other socialist community nations from national liberation movements and to deprive the latter of assistance and support from these countries.

No matter how groundless these schemes were, they nonetheless formed a part of the U.S. concept of detente in the first half of the 1970's. Utilizing precisely this scheme, Republican strategists in the White House sought to convince the U.S. ruling class, including conservative circles, that detente signifies not retreat but a tactic of achievement of long-range U.S. strategic objectives in the world arena and preservation of U.S. global positions, a tactic fraught with less risk of military confrontation. "To help transform the Soviet Union from a 'revolutionary' nation into a country guarding 'legality,' with its own interest in maintaining stability, was the essence of the Kissinger concept of detente,"⁵ a leading magazine of U.S. business circles recently stated. When this scheme failed, it turned a portion of the U.S. ruling class against detente, and thus against the USSR as well.

Other internal factors influencing U.S. ruling circles in the same anti-detente direction included the fact that the U.S. ruling elite had gotten over the trauma of the defeat in Indochina and the fact that the North-eastern political and financial clique had won the struggle to retain leading political positions in U.S. society. Richard Nixon's departure from the White House as a result of the Watergate scandal signified, in addition to all else, that the same establishment, which had been running the affairs of the Washington "center" for the last 50 years and which Nixon wanted to "liquidate" by "infusing new blood into the Washington leadership,"⁶ had won and had preserved intact its leadership position in the nation's political mechanism. This infused new energy and new boldness into Washington's political elite, which had risen again following Watergate. Repudiating the "foreign policy pessimism" of Nixon-Kissinger, who held that the United States should shift from the manipulation of world events to adaptation to new developments, this elite set forth a new, "optimistic" plan, worked out in detail by Z. Brzezinski. The very emergence onto stage center by Brzezinski and his confederates with the change of administration in 1977 symbolized the beginning of a shift in U.S. foreign policy to a new course, which was initially accompanied by the sharp ideologization of foreign policy and, in particular, by the initiation of a demagogic campaign "in defense of human rights."

II.

In contrast to the Nixon Administration, the new Carter Administration held that the United States should not cling desperately to the status quo in the world because, like it or not, the world is in a process of change. But this change should be given a direction to the liking of the United States. "Instead of seeking to maintain the status quo on the basis of a balance of power," stated Brzezinski, "we are endeavoring to perceive the global changes as a fact, but we are endeavoring to give them a constructive direction which will be compatible with U.S. interests and U.S. principles and will conform to them."⁷

In this way, U.S. foreign policy was brought "full circle" by the strategists of U.S. imperialism--from attempts to adapt to the external world and participate in collective efforts by the international community of nations to create an egalitarian system of international relations, to an adventuristic, hegemonistic policy of "shaping" the external situation to fit U.S. plans and schemes, from an endeavor to reduce the gap between U.S. global political ambitions and realistic U.S. material potential by reducing arrogance, to expansion and the renewal of Washington's hegemonistic pretensions.

In his most recent foreign policy actions and statements, President Carter did not count on solving problems through compromise, but through "tests of strength" and the exacerbation of crises. To achieve this end, plans call for the renewal and buildup of U.S. military strength. Even the language of the most recent, 1980 State of the Union address very strongly resembles the haughty and bombastic rhetoric of the 1960's. "We should be willing to pay any price (!) to remain the world's most powerful nation," Carter said. At the same time, he demanded "economic sacrifices" of the nation or, in other words, "any burden."⁸ Defining the sphere of U.S. "vital interests," Carter extended U.S. great-power "responsibility" to Asia and Africa, the Far East, the Near and Middle East, and Latin America--in short, the entire world. He let it be known that Washington is willing to take any steps for the sake of asserting this "responsibility," including the direct deployment of U.S. military forces.

In addition to attempts to "shape" world events according to the U.S. "script," a second new element in U.S. foreign policy strategy when the new administration came to power in 1977 was a policy change in the area of Soviet-U.S. relations. They were declared to be not of central significance and were relegated to third or fourth place in the system of U.S. foreign policy priorities, in a statement made by the President's national security adviser, Z. Brzezinski. But the most important thing was the following: The idea of creating a "clash" between the Soviet Union and the developing countries on any given problem and thus at least temporarily diverting their attention from U.S. great-power policy began to dominate, in place of the former view regarding the necessity of closer relations with the USSR in the interests of world stability, in operational foreign policy planning by the National Security Council, headed by Brzezinski (as was

noted in the U.S. press, this was done contrary to the views of the U.S. State Department). Both Brzezinski's admirers and his critics among U.S. journalists unanimously agree that he was downright possessed by this idea from the moment of his White House appointment. It is for this reason that all policy planning by the National Security Council was focused on an endeavor to implement this idea.

With the goal of strengthening the West's position in the region of the developing nations, Washington considered it essential to strengthen the unity of the capitalist countries under the U.S. aegis. Hence the so-called "trilateral scheme"--the unification of capitalism's three "power centers": the United States, Western Europe, and Japan--a scheme also elaborated by Brzezinski. Thus the reestablishment of the U.S. "position of strength" in the world was to be achieved not so much by U.S. efforts at economic growth and development and the resolution of numerous domestic problems of crisis proportions as at the expense and through the efforts of others.

After nurturing his idea of U.S. "direction of changes in the world" and "interception of revolutions" for approximately 20 years, however, Brzezinski failed to consider one important change which had taken place while he was "perfecting" his scheme, namely the fact that the principal movements and processes in the developing nations had changed during that time from anticolonial revolutions, whose affection the United States had tried to win in the 1960's, into revolutions against neocolonial exploitation. For the most part they were focused against the dominance of U.S. monopoly capital, that principal exploitative power which continues to hold many of these countries in a position of economic dependence, in a position of a supplier of raw materials, cheap labor and markets for progressive technology. It is precisely for this reason that the movement of these countries against external dependence is chiefly and primarily a revolt against U.S. neocolonialism.

A world in which the United States takes the "position of protector of the status quo and establishes many rules and regulations guarantees that the United States will be the inevitable target of all discontent," impartially states prominent U.S. political scientist S. Hoffmann. "Everybody hates America; everybody, not only the Moslem countries," emotionally declares M. Qadhafi, leader of the Libyan revolution. "Because everybody either has been oppressed or is still being oppressed by America, and sooner or later will rise up against America, even the non-Moslem countries."¹⁰

The accuracy of these statements is best illustrated by the fact that practically all those countries which, according to the White House scheme, should have become the principal supporters of U.S. policy in the various parts of the developing world are now in the vanguard of opposition to this policy. Mexico charges that U.S. policy toward that country is a "mixture of [selfish] interests, contempt and fear" and demands that the United States pursue a policy of "peaceful coexistence."¹¹ In 1977 Brazil ostentatiously repudiated all military agreements with the United States,

giving notice that it had no desire to be subjected to U.S. dictates. Argentina recently unequivocally reasserted its negative position vis-a-vis Washington policy, refusing to go along with the U.S. decision to terminate grain sales to the Soviet Union. India, Indonesia, Nigeria--whose president, General Obasanjo, during Carter's visit to Nigeria, publicly condemned U.S. support of the racist regime in South Africa and even insisted that this censure be included in a joint communique--all these new "centers of influence," to use White House terminology, which maintain normal relations with the United States, in one form or another quite unequivocally express their disapproval of U.S. foreign policy. Even Saudi Arabia, which Washington tries to bind close with colossal deliveries of modern military hardware (a policy Washington had previously employed with Iran), is trying to dissociate itself from the United States to some degree. And not only Saudi Arabia, but even the military regime in Pakistan is evidently not sure whether it should "leap into the embrace" of the United States, which has promised a little donation of 400 million dollars. Many Asian countries which have had an alliance with Washington at some time in the past had had every chance to see the full depth of perfidy and treachery of the United States, which seeks to obtain at a cheap price clients willing to do the dirty work of protecting U.S. imperialist interests. In Ethiopia and Iran anti-Americanism was the watchword of the revolutions in these countries.

Which of the "key countries" designated by Washington remains in the U.S. orbit? Sadat's Egypt?!

It is precisely U.S. recognition of the failure of its policy of utilizing leading developing countries as supports of U.S. regional and global military strategy that evoked cries of panic in the United States in connection with the "crescent of crisis," etc. At the same time, it has led to stepped-up U.S. efforts to attain U.S. objectives by the "inverse" method--by putting the Soviet Union at odds with the developing nations and elevating somewhat the actions of America as a country "opposing Soviet intrigues."

III.

Today it is perfectly obvious that, although U.S.-Soviet relations were officially relegated to third or even fourth place among foreign policy priorities by the Carter Administration, the principal and all-absorbing concern of White House strategists since 1977 has been the attempt to effect some "limited test of strength" with the USSR. This would be a "test" which, on the one hand, could not be very dangerous but, on the other, could enable Washington to demonstrate its "resolve" and "firmness."

Africa was chosen as the first area for such a "test." In Africa the United States attempted to utilize the fact that the USSR and Cuba were giving diversified aid and assistance to Ethiopia in repelling Somali aggression in order to artificially whip up an anti-Soviet campaign. The White House tried to force a number of African nations to come out in opposition to Soviet assistance, but no one in Africa responded to the U.S.

urging, for the Africans themselves--in contrast to Washington officials--held this assistance to be justified.

Then the NSC proceeded to plan direct U.S. military intervention in the events taking place in that part of Africa. But "even the Pentagon," commented U.S. journalist E. Drew in the NEW YORKER magazine, "on the basis of recent experience was not inclined to be drawn into a situation where we would be unable to win in the end." Washington was trying to create the impression that the USSR was violating the "rules of detente" with its policy in the Horn of Africa. The State Department, however, held that "what the Soviet Union has done in the Horn region violated not detente but that view of detente which Kissinger advocated.... When the United States and the Soviet Union signed a joint declaration on principles in 1972 (the document in question in the "Principles of Mutual Relations Between the USSR and the United States"--G. T.), the Soviet Union was not giving up the right to compete with the United States or support various governments and revolutionary movements."¹²

In short, the U.S. attempt to arrange for a "test of strength" with the USSR in connection with the events in the Horn of Africa ended in failure.

The next attempt to aggravate U.S.-Soviet relations was made by Washington during the Camp David talks in fall 1978. The Carter Administration, which prior to this time had perfidiously violated the Soviet-U.S. understanding on the Middle East, which had been officially spelled out in the joint declaration of 1 October 1977, proceeded to push through a separate Egyptian-Israeli deal under the U.S. aegis.

The antimonarchic, anti-imperialist revolution in Iran, which began in mid-1978 and came to a successful conclusion in February 1979, spoiled the White House's Middle Eastern game, for Iran evolved from a U.S. outpost to an anti-American force in the Persian Gulf zone. American rightist circles, which were in favor of the Carter Administration's anti-Soviet policies, attempted to utilize the Iranian revolution for another anti-Soviet campaign. It proved impossible, however, to find any evidence of Soviet interference in Iran's internal affairs, and even to invent evidence to this effect. This scheme therefore also failed.

In addition, many political observers saw, in the firm and resolute position taken by the USSR in defense of the Iranian revolution and in its declaration that it would view any interference in the affairs of neighboring Iran as behavior affecting Soviet security interests, an important factor in the restraint displayed by the United States during the events in Iran. Naturally, this impression was diametrically opposite to that which Washington would like to convey in all those instances when it has resorted to shows of "toughness" and lies about the "Soviet threat."

The fact that U.S. diplomats were taken hostage in Iran in November 1979, however, was utilized by U.S. rightist forces, playing on nationalistic, patriotic-chauvinistic attitudes, as a convenient excuse to reinforce

their position. Seeking to profit from the claim that the United States was being "ignored" and was allegedly being constantly humiliated, these forces, with the support of the government, launched an offensive in the domestic arena: They demanded the restoration of the U.S. "position of strength" in the world and a return of past U.S. grandeur. This appeal fell on fertile soil, which had long retained numerous "cold war" carry-overs and accretions. The military-industrial complex also raised its voice, arguing that it had been "robbed of its fair share" in the first half of the 1970's and that this was allegedly dooming the United States to "military weakness" in the first half of the 1980's, creating for the USSR "a zone of opportunity" to exploit this "weakness" in its own interests.

Against this background, the events of December 1979 in Afghanistan were utilized by Washington leaders, supported by the now-stronger rightist forces, to formulate their previous efforts at opposing the Soviet Union into an elaborate long-range militaristic program--a "Carter Doctrine." It is no coincidence that, in his State of the Union message to Congress, the U.S. President emphasized the "clear and present danger" to U.S. interests--that is, he directly employed the terminology of the "Committee on the Present Danger" and the other U.S. right-wing organizations which energetically supported his militaristic program.

IV.

What are the most specific goals and aims of U.S. military and political strategy, as stipulated in Carter's new program?

The main goal is a new round of the arms race in an attempt to shift the balance of military power with the USSR in favor of the United States. The new round is apparently supposed to accomplish the following three tasks:

To secure a position of "relative strength" for the United States--that is, partial military and technological superiority within the framework of existing Soviet-U.S. agreements on strategic arms limitation or outside the framework of such agreements;

To increase U.S. ability and preparedness for actual combat operations;

To draw the USSR into further competition in the field of arms buildup, with emphasis on the qualitative improvement of strategic systems and a quantitative and qualitative augmentation of conventional arms.

American leaders now consider the principal objective in the area of strategic offensive arms to be an increase in the "counterstrike" potential of U.S. strategic forces through the development of new strategic weapon systems suitable for strikes against military "point" targets. This task is being accomplished by putting into production highly accurate air-to-ground strategic cruise missiles (with a range of approximately 2,500 km and a warhead yield of 200 kt), placing new, more powerful and more accurate warheads of the Mk-12A type on the Minuteman-3 ICBM (three per missile,

each yielding 350 kt), preparations to build and deploy in the latter half of the 1980's the new MX mobile ICBM (launch weight approximately 95 tons, 10 warheads of up to 500 kt each), as well as development of a new MARV system, with missile warheads which can maneuver in the final phase of the trajectory to the target.

In spite of the new militaristic and anti-Soviet campaign in the United States, and in spite of President J. Carter's ostentatious postponement of the ratification of the SALT-2 Treaty, the Carter Administration has officially declared that it intends to observe the restrictions specified by the SALT-1 Agreement and the SALT-2 Treaty, on the condition of observance by the Soviet Union as well.¹³ Nevertheless the United States is attempting, even within the framework of existing agreements, to obtain for itself certain advantages in regard to capability to deliver a first--"disarming"--strike on Soviet military targets (missiles, bombers), in order to weaken the force of a Soviet retaliatory strike. Realizing, however, the impossibility of acquiring the potential of a "full counterforce strike"--that is, a strike which would guarantee U.S. survival after a Soviet retaliatory strike--U.S. leaders are endeavoring to increase the "counterforce" potential, evidently to exert pressure on our country in order to drag us into retaliatory measures with all of the ensuing expense. This is being done primarily in an attempt to create a "general force background" favorable to the United States, which would enable the United States to more actively utilize its conventional forces and weapons in so-called "local crisis situations."

Today many competent experts in the West agree that, in coming years--with or without the SALT-2 Treaty--the situation of "mutual restraint" between the USSR and United States will be retained, since each of the parties will retain a guaranteed capability to inflict unacceptable damage on the other in a retaliatory strike. Proceeding from this, experts claim that conflicts involving the employment of conventional weapons, with or without the participation of the great powers, will remain the principal type of conflict in the 1980's. In spite of the attention the present U.S. Administration is devoting to strategic arms, in recent years it has been placing strong emphasis on the development and reinforcement of American conventional forces and arms intended for the conduct of large-scale military operations in Europe and for employment in local conflicts.

As regards Europe, U.S. and NATO military experts have drawn up an extensive plan for the deployment of a substantial quantity of U.S. military equipment in the countries of Western Europe in order to ensure, in a crisis situation, accelerated transport to Europe and deployment of additional U.S. divisions. At present, four full U.S. combat divisions and three brigades are stationed in Western Europe; these brigades can also be rapidly converted into divisions, since arms for this are now available locally. The present goal is to establish military equipment depots for three more U.S. divisions. The United States also possesses the capability of rapid deployment (within 10 days) of 40 tactical air squadrons (more

than 900 aircraft) to Western European countries, thus substantially increasing NATO nuclear air forces. We know from a statement by Defense Secretary M. Brown that it is planned by 1983 to secure the capability to redeploy, during the same period of time, 60 squadrons of tactical aircraft, and this is in addition to the 28 squadrons already stationed at bases in Western Europe and Turkey.¹⁴

So-called "fast reaction forces," preparations for the establishment of which began in 1977, are designated for operations in regions other than Europe. Carter's new program calls for taking "rapid and vigorous measures" to complete the formation of a 100,000-man "fast-reaction corps," and Washington is presently strongly emphasizing its preparedness to utilize these forces in case of a "threat to U.S. national interests," viewed very broadly. Demonstrating this willingness, at the end of April 1980 the United States undertook military intervention against Iran. If this operation had not failed at an early stage, Washington would evidently have ignited the conflagration of a major war in the Middle East.

Permanent headquarters of a U.S. operational combined unit for the Caribbean has also been established by a presidential decision. This force is intended primarily for the exertion of "show-of-force" pressure on socialist Cuba and other Latin American governments that are objectionable to the United States.

In order to finance this new military program, the U.S. military budget is being substantially enlarged, and there has also been the proposal to shift once again from the current principle of an all-volunteer army to the draft, which was abolished during the Nixon Administration. As a first step, the President has decided to introduce mandatory registration of American induction-age youth.

Attempting by roundabout ways to avoid a situation of strategic parity between the United States and the USSR, Washington decided to "adjust" the arms balance in Europe to an even greater extent in its own favor. To this end, under pressure from Washington the NATO Council adopted a decision in December 1979 to deploy in 1983-1984 some 464 ground-to-ground cruise missiles and 108 Pershing-2 mobile intermediate range ballistic missiles on the territory of a number of Western European NATO countries (Great Britain, the FRG and Italy). NATO and U.S. leaders explain that this decision was caused by the necessity of "compensating for NATO's lag" behind the Warsaw Pact nations in nuclear weapons of corresponding types. However, according to the figures of these same authoritative NATO sources, the total number of nuclear warheads at NATO's disposal in Europe is at least double the number of warheads of the same type at the disposal of the Warsaw Pact.¹⁵

In addition, while NATO nuclear delivery systems have been upgraded time and time again in the last 20 years, Soviet intermediate range nuclear missiles, as is confirmed by the figures of the London International

Institute for Strategic Studies, have not been upgraded since their initial deployment at the end of the 1950's and the early 1960's, while their numbers have not increased but, rather, have decreased. And the modernization of Soviet missile launchers which is taking place at the present time (the total number of launching pads is not increasing) is merely a response by the USSR to corresponding NATO preparations. But even under conditions where the provisions of the SALT-2 Treaty do not include in the overall balance U.S. nuclear weapon systems deployed in Western Europe and targeted at the USSR (not to mention French and British strategic nuclear weapon systems), and where in the last 20 years there has been repeated improvement in the quality of NATO's European nuclear arsenal, the government of the USSR, seeking to deepen detente in Europe, has unequivocally demonstrated its goodwill. It has expressed willingness, if new U.S. "Eurostrategic" missiles are not deployed in Western Europe, to reduce the number of Soviet intermediate range missiles deployed in the western half of the USSR.

The U.S. refusal to initiate dialog with the USSR prior to the adoption of NATO's decision specifying measures aimed at acquiring additional advantages in the balance of the "Eurostrategic" nuclear forces of the two sides, constitutes convincing evidence that Washington's strategy is aimed not at the stabilization of the international situation, including conditions in Europe, but rather at its aggravation.

This is also indicated by the Washington-sanctioned sale of arms to China by U.S. allies, at the present time by Washington's stated willingness to enter into direct military cooperation with China.

We could also mention other measures aimed at altering the existing balance of regional power to the U.S. benefit. These include urging Japan to step up military preparations and increase its military budget, as well as rearming the South Korean regime with new U.S. military hardware. Other provocative actions, from the standpoint of Soviet security interests, can be seen in U.S. activity in the Near and Middle East, also initiated long before the events in Afghanistan. We are referring primarily to the rearming of both Israel and Egypt with U.S. heavy equipment, including aircraft, and the transformation of these countries into outposts of the U.S. military presence in this region.

Nor can one fail to see the colossal concentration of U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean, particularly in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf, where four U.S. attack carrier groups were stationed in May 1980, not to mention other U.S. warships. Official Washington explains this concentration of naval forces near the Soviet borders with the events in Iran. Let us assume that the excessive concentration of U.S. naval forces in this region was due to an attempt to exert military pressure on Iran. But Washington's general course of action, aimed at militarizing the Indian Ocean, was evidenced long before the revolution in Iran, when Iran was still viewed by Washington as a U.S. bulwark in that region. Soviet-American talks on the limitation of military activity in the Indian Ocean were unilaterally broken off by the United States at the beginning of 1978, for the reason that precisely at

this time the Pentagon had drawn up plans for increased U.S. military activity in the region. This was connected both with the deployment of new submarines, armed with Trident ballistic missiles, and with decisions to intensify military pressure on the Middle Eastern countries. Attesting to the latter decision, for example, was the cruise by the U.S. aircraft carrier "Constellation" and a group of missile-armed warships to the shores of the Arabian Peninsula in March 1979.

All these measures taken together attest directly to the following: Admitting the impossibility of moving radically ahead of the Soviet Union in the area of strategic arms, the United States decided to shift the balance of power in its own favor by altering regional military balances of nuclear and non-nuclear arms, of land and naval forces, both through its own activities and by stepping up the military preparations of its allies and clients. In spite of all this, there are still some in Washington who demagogically try to argue about some "rules of the game"--rules of restraint which the Soviet side is allegedly violating.

The United States, convinced that it is unable to halt, with the aid of nonmilitary methods and means, the development of the revolutionary struggle of the world public, which is directed against U.S. neocolonial dominance, has now once again placed its bet on the methods of military pressure.

The Carter Administration has, on numerous occasions, criticized the "diplomatic acrobatics" of H. Kissinger,¹⁶ who served as secretary of state under the two preceding administrations. Now the Carter Administration has taken the path of premature decision-making, which substitutes risky improvisation for a sober strategic situation analysis and thoroughly conceived foreign policy measures.

The above are the quite definite conclusions that can be drawn from an analysis of the Carter program or "doctrine."

It is true that this "doctrine" does contain one nuance which somewhat distinguishes it from the aggressive U.S. doctrines of the 1950's and 1960's. The present U.S. leadership, making a sharp shift in the direction of anti-Soviet resistance, is nevertheless compelled to acknowledge the cardinal significance of relations between today's two "superpowers." "Today, just as throughout the last 35 years, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are the most critical factor in determining whether the world will live in peace or whether it will be plunged into a global conflict," stated J. Carter in a speech before Congress on 23 January 1980.¹⁷

This statement, made at a time of aggravation of U.S.-Soviet relations and the overall international situation, attests to the fact that the Washington leaders realize the importance of maintaining a certain level of mutual understanding with the USSR, in spite of all U.S. crude "shows of strength." It is regrettable, however, that the President declared the

central importance of U.S.-Soviet relations for the fate of the world as a whole after a period of 3 years during which they had been considered secondary among the foreign policy priorities of the administration, which had done everything to bring these relations to their present state. If this had not been so, the President would possibly have listened more closely to the voices of those in the U.S. "corridors of power" who advocate a more balanced, less emotional foreign policy and who hold that detente is just as necessary to the United States as to the Soviet Union or any other country in the world.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 23 February 1980.
2. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 30.
3. "President John Kennedy: To Turn the Tide," edited by J. Gardner, N.Y., 1962, p 7.
4. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 21 January 1973.
5. FORTUNE, 23 April 1979, p 72.
6. For more detail, see MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, No 6, 1979, pp 141-144.
7. BUSINESS WEEK, 12 September 1977, p 112.
8. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, 28 January 1980, p 196.
9. S. Hoffmann, "Muscle and Brain," FOREIGN POLICY, No 37 (Winter 1979/80), p 9.
10. THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 17 December 1979.
11. TIME, 8 October 1979, p 33.
12. THE NEW YORKER, 1 May 1978, pp 116-121.
13. But "who can count on Washington's verbal assurances at a time when it readily refuses to put its signature to dozens of international agreements? It should be absolutely clear that the SALT-2 Treaty will go into force only after its ratification by the legislative bodies of the signatory nations" (PRAVDA, 9 March 1980).
14. "Secretary of Defense Annual Report FY 1979," Wash., 1978, p 38; "The Military Balance 1979/80," London, 1979, p 8.

15. "The Military Balance 1977/78," London, 1977, pp 108-109.
16. See, for example, FORTUNE, 23 April 1979, p 71.
17. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 24 January 1980.

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THE MIDDLE EAST AND AMERICAN STRATEGY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 80
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[Article by A. K. Kislov]

[Text] The events of recent months in the Near and Middle East,¹ and particularly those in Iran and Afghanistan, which were largely a result of American imperialist intrigues, were nonetheless used by the U.S. Government as an excuse for politically insuring the exceptionally dangerous Washington policy line that noticeably complicated international affairs at the turn of the decade. The last year or year and a half have been truly filled with exceptionally stormy events with far-reaching consequences in this region. But perhaps the most significant of these events, having a serious effect on Washington policy over the long range, was the collapse of the shah's regime in Iran.

It would be difficult to overestimate the role assigned to the shah's regime in the regional and even the global designs of Washington. At the beginning of the 1970's the line of recruiting others to protect U.S. imperialist interests in various parts of the world was officially announced in the so-called "Nixon Doctrine." In the Middle East, especially the Persian Gulf region, which accounts for two-thirds of all petroleum exports in the world, the shah's Iran was supposed to play this role of regional policeman and did try to play this role for several years. Ample proof of this can be found in its seizure of three islands at the inlet of the Strait of Hormuz, connecting the Persian Gulf with the Indian Ocean, which allowed Iran to put the "main oil route" in the capitalist world under its own--but, actually, America's--control. More evidence was provided when Iranian troops were sent out to suppress the liberation struggle in Oman. It is also known that the shah actively supported conservative pro-American regimes in a number of developing countries and took part in the fight against growing revolutionary and progressive tendencies in these countries.

Besides this, Iran itself was one of the most important sources of oil for virtually the entire capitalist world. Even though Iranian oil did not

account for a large share of total U.S. consumption, it was extremely significant for Washington's Western European allies, and especially for Japan. As for such American partners as Israel and South Africa, shipments of oil from Iran covered 50 percent and 90 percent, respectively, of their requirements. Occupying second place in world oil exports and, as a result, having huge currency reserves at its disposal, the shah's regime used these funds for unlimited weapon purchases instead of improving the Iranian people's standard of living. In some years Iran absorbed up to 40 percent of all American weapon exports. The shah was never reluctant to spend the money on weapons, and Washington, in turn, lifted all restrictions on the sale of military equipment to Iran. As a result, Iran was often the recipient of equipment which had practically not even reached the American Army as yet.

Iran's purchases of American weapons brought the U.S. military-industrial complex fantastic profits. Moreover, they aided directly in financing U.S. research and experimental design projects in the military sphere. This created a situation which was exceptionally profitable for the United States, in which Iran paid Washington for its own services in protecting U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf zone, and this also had a favorable effect on the state of the U.S. balance of payments. According to the plans of Pentagon strategists, the colossal reserves of American weapons accumulated by Iran could, if necessary, be used by American armed forces as well as Iranian forces. Besides this, Washington saw Iran as an important bridgehead at the southern border of the Soviet Union, which was also used extensively for radar surveillance of the USSR.

The collapse of the despotic regime in Iran, which was described by the U.S. President as "an island of stability in one of the most restless parts of the world"² just a few days before the first massive anti-shah demonstrations by the Iranian people, had a considerable effect on more than just the bilateral relationship between the United States and Iran. Iran's radical foreign policy reorientation gave rise to a chain reaction, which ultimately led to the complete--judicial as well as actual--dissolution of the CENTO bloc, created by the United States and Great Britain during the cold war years. The disintegration of CENTO confirmed the total groundlessness of the old American approach to the problem of uniting pro-imperialist forces in the developing countries under the U.S. aegis. But this was not all. Washington had also placed enormous hopes in the shah's Iran as the "showcase" of what "the developing countries could achieve with U.S. assistance." The fall of the shah dealt a severe blow to American prestige and served as a warning to the rulers who had relied on U.S. support.

The warning sounded particularly convincing to a number of conservative regimes in the Middle East, which lost faith in the United States' ability to take effective steps to save them when necessary. This stimulated vigorous activity on the part of political groups (often far from progressive) which had objected to this lopsided orientation and had counseled the

parallel development of relations with other Western countries, with neighboring states and even with the socialist countries. Members of feudal-monarchic groups in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, for example, began to seriously consider the rapid consolidation of their domestic political positions and the expansion of ties with other nationalist groups in the Arab world on a pan-Arabian or pan-Islamic basis even in those cases when this could cause friction in relations with the imperialist powers, especially the United States.

The Iranian events also had a serious effect on the position of the United States' chief ally in the Middle East--Israel. In essence, they marked the absolute collapse of the Israeli policy of establishing support points along the periphery of the Arab world. Besides this, the victory of the revolution in Iran and its move to a pan-Islamic foreign policy position, on the one hand, strengthened the forces in the Arab world which were definitely opposed to separate bargains with Israel, particularly the Palestine Liberation Organization, which had extremely close contacts with revolutionary forces in Iran, and on the other, caused Israeli ruling circles to seriously doubt the reliability of American safeguards, the domestic political stability of the Sadat regime in Egypt and, consequently, the durability of the agreements concluded with Sadat. This brought about increased rigidity in Israeli positions at the Egyptian-Israeli separate talks and the voicing of demands for "additional safeguards" just at the time when the Carter Administration was particularly interested in the successful outcome of these talks, in connection with campaign strategy as well as other considerations.

On the whole, we can completely agree with some American politicians who described the Iranian revolution, from the standpoint of its effects on the United States, as "one of the most serious strategic disasters encountered by the United States in the postwar period."³

How did Washington react to this "serious strategic disaster"? First it began to make desperate efforts, which are still being planned, to maintain and even expand its agent service in Iran, for the purpose of, on the one hand, fueling antigovernment feeling and, on the other, eradicating the traces of its direct intervention in Iranian internal affairs and "taming" the new leaders. The latter aspect of Washington's policy toward Iran was particularly apparent in the 1980 State of the Union Message, in which J. Carter declared that the United States "has no quarrel with the Iranian revolution or the Iranian people" and is "willing to cooperate with the Iranian Government in the development of new and mutually beneficial relations."⁴ At the same time, the policy of blackmail and threats was being carried out on an increasingly broad scale in relations with Iran.

The flagrant pressure exerted on this nation took on particularly frenzied and overt forms after 4 November 1979, when Iranian students seized the Embassy of the United States of America in Tehran. Using this act as a pretext to conceal and justify its own aggressive behavior, Washington sent

a naval fleet of unprecedented strength for peacetime to the shores of Iran.

Washington simultaneously took the most vigorous steps to prevent the disruption of the Camp David bargain. Countries in this region became the site of constant pilgrimages by high-level American statesmen: Prominent American diplomat A. Atherton made a tour in January 1979, Secretary of Defense H. Brown did this in February, and the President himself took part in the "shuttle diplomacy" in March.

The American efforts seem to have had definite results: A separate Egyptian-Israeli agreement was finally concluded in March 1979. But this could not neutralize the negative effects of the events in Iran on the United States. Moreover, the very fact that this document was signed created an even wider gap between the policy of the Sadat regime and prevailing feelings in the Moslem world. The situation was also complicated by the fact that Washington's policy, aimed at the vigorous promotion of an Egyptian-Israeli separate bargain, essentially signified the actual rejection of the course toward a comprehensive, all-encompassing, just and therefore lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict with the participation of all sides involved, including the PLO. By unilaterally renouncing the positive line set forth in the joint Soviet-American statement on the Middle East of 1 October 1977, Washington was openly gambling on success by means of separate bargains. This not only undermined faith in the Carter Administration as a reliable negotiating partner, but continued to exacerbate the already extremely dangerous situation in the Arab-Israeli conflict zone. This was reflected primarily in a new round of the arms race in the Middle East, begun by the immediate participants in the Camp David bargain--Israel, Egypt and the United States--as well as in the dramatic exacerbation of conditions in Lebanon, where Israel and its minions began to display particularly insolent and provocative behavior.

Washington was also faced with the problem of overcoming the consequences of Iran's renunciation of its police functions in the Persian Gulf zone. In the first half of 1979 the United States already felt the need to demonstrate its willingness to use the methods of power politics. Among other military displays, a squadron of F-15 fighter planes was sent to Saudi Arabia, a group of ships with the Constellation and Midway aircraft carriers in the lead entered the Indian Ocean, emergency "military aid" of around 400 million dollars was arranged for the Yemen Arab Republic and American military advisers were sent to Yemen. These steps were taken against the background of repeated statements by Secretary of Defense H. Brown and then Secretary of Energy J. Schlesinger about the United States' willingness to use the American Armed Forces to protect its "oil interests" in the Middle East. According to Washington's plans, this was supposed to demonstrate the United States' determination to defend its Middle Eastern allies against "external and internal dangers."

At the same time, in an attempt to compensate for the loss of the Iranian bridgehead, Washington began a vigorous search for new military bases and

support points, and not only directly in the Middle East but even in adjacent regions. In this connection, even greater significance was attached to the American base on the small coral atoll of Diego Garcia in the center of the Indian Ocean. A decision was made in Washington to continue the work involved in its further reinforcement and enlargement, on which another 173 million dollars is to be spent. It is indicative that the United States simultaneously began to openly sabotage the Soviet-U.S. talks on the limitation of military activity in the Indian Ocean basin. After unilaterally breaking off these talks at the beginning of 1978, the American side is still stubbornly refusing to resume them and, in addition, is still systematically building up its military presence in the Indian Ocean.

This behavior of the Washington Administration in the Middle East and the militant statements accompanying it naturally cannot be examined in total isolation from its general course of more vigorous attempts to impede objective historical processes, reestablish American imperialism's shaky position in the world with the aid of escalated international tension, undermine detente and escalate the arms race. Setting the tone for this course, the United States has made and is making a massive effort to build up its military potential and is involving the Western European countries in this process. This entire campaign is being accompanied by the discussion of ways to overcome the "post-Vietnam syndrome"--that is, the view, which has become quite prevalent in the United States as a result of the bitter lessons of Vietnam, that the role of world policeman must be renounced. "If there is anything good about the Iranian incident, it is the fact that it will completely cure the nation of its Vietnam syndrome,"⁵ said J. Sisco, former assistant secretary of state and now the president of Washington's American University.

Carter's message to Congress on 23 January 1980 actually announced a transition to the old "gunboat policy," although this move is being passed off as a "new strategy." It essentially boils down to frank claims to the "right" to issue dictates in any part of the world that Washington unilaterally declares a sphere of U.S. "vital interests" and to prevent, in any part of the world, social or other changes of no benefit to the United States. Carter threatened to "use all necessary means, including military force," whenever Washington feels that these "interests" might be disregarded. In an apparent attempt to give these threats more weight, the President has announced that the United States intends to "remain the strongest nation in the world."⁶

In connection with this, he set forth a broad program for the militarization of the country, which takes in virtually all categories of weapons and armed forces. But some of its elements, such as the specific plans to create an interventionist "fast reaction corps" and a special fleet of floating naval bases and transport aviation to carry large military units to the most remote regions, the reinforcement and expansion of U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean and the search for new bases in this region, are actually aimed against the developing countries and, above all, against the countries of the Middle East.

As "grounds" for this militant program, the U.S. President made frequent references to the seizure of the American hostages in Iran and the events in Afghanistan, simultaneously distorting Soviet policy in relations with these countries.

In fact, as later events showed, Washington had begun to actively plan and implement its own interventionist program long before these events.

The first signs of the provocative line which Washington is now trying to confine within the organizational and political framework of a single theory, were already seen during Carter's first year in the White House. As he himself said, from the very first year, his administration began to "considerably and constantly increase military spending." The President's national security adviser, Z. Brzezinski, "advised the creation of rapid response forces to be used in the event of crises in the Third World countries" as early as mid-1977, the NEW YORK TIMES reported. "On the whole, the idea of creating these forces was approved by Carter in August 1977,... At the end of last February," the newspaper goes on, "Brzezinski convinced the President to consent to a more active American military role in the Middle East, including the areas of weapon sales, naval presence in the Indian Ocean and the establishment of military bases."⁷

This is not simply a matter, however, of the "evil genius" of Z. Brzezinski. Virtually the entire Washington establishment became vigorously involved in the escalation of the arms race in general and the race in the Middle East in particular. It is known, for example, that soon after the fall of the shah of Iran--that is, more than a year ago--the Pentagon distributed a long report on "Military Alternatives in the Persian Gulf," which was compiled at the request of Pentagon Chief H. Brown and which was described as the "most comprehensive of all military analyses of the state of affairs in the region ever undertaken by the government."⁸

Washington's specific plans to expand the American military presence in the Middle East were described in great detail as early as July 1979 by a well-informed source--the Washington weekly U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT.⁹ Many articles on this topic also appeared in other American press organs at that time.

Consequently, neither the April 1978 revolution in Afghanistan nor, in particular, the Soviet military assistance given to this nation constituted the real reason for Washington's provocative behavior. The facts show that it was precisely the United States that was creating another extremely dangerous seat of tension by giving broad military support to the Afghan counterrevolutionaries and by directing and coordinating their activities. There is no question that all Afghan reactionary forces, consisting of feudal leaders, the stooges of the former king and President Daoud, who was overthrown by the revolution, the comprador bourgeoisie and the reactionary tribal chiefs, could not accept the revolution and were prepared to use any means to restore the old order. They hoped for the support of

some of the ignorant and downtrodden peasants and nomads who had been erased by religious propaganda. "The rebellion of the old Moslem conservative and traditionalist society against the upheavals caused by the revolution do not demand any explanation on the whole," France's FIGARO remarked on 3 July 1979. "But as soon as the first signs of this rebellion were seen, American specialists immediately realized the advantages they could derive from it, and the government followed their advice."

Washington has long displayed increased interest in Afghanistan, regarding this country, particularly after the loss of its bases in Iran, as a possible bridgehead for subversive action and espionage against the USSR. The limited contingent of Soviet armed forces sent to Afghanistan, at the request of its government and on the basis of the Soviet-Afghan friendship treaty, to assist in defending Afghanistan against invasion by outside counterrevolutionary forces evoked a stormy response in Washington because it wrecked U.S. plans.

"The events in Afghanistan are not the real reason for the present exacerbation of international affairs," L. I. Brezhnev said. "If it had not been for Afghanistan, certain circles in the United States and in NATO would most likely have found another excuse to aggravate the world situation."¹⁰

According to the WASHINGTON POST, one government official said: "Afghanistan was a heaven-sent stroke of luck. The events in Afghanistan presented an opportunity to act in line with changes in approach that had already actually been made."¹¹

These changes took several directions, by means of which the administration tried to cover literally every aspect of international life and Soviet-American relations--from economics and politics to cultural, scientific and sports contacts, all the way to a boycott of the Olympic Games in Moscow. It is striking that Washington, in an attempt to camouflage the actual purpose of its overtly provocative behavior, made a massive effort to reinforce it politically by organizing a broad anti-Soviet campaign on the global scale. Using the capture of American diplomats in Tehran and the events in Afghanistan as a pretext, Washington did everything within its power to spread this campaign to the United Nations and other international forums, including the developing countries. Within the framework of this article it would seem expedient, however, to discuss only the actual signs of Washington's "new strategy" that are directly linked with the Middle East.

Above all, it is striking that Washington is still vigorously building up its assault forces in this part of the world on the pretext of "protection from Soviet aggression." This does not only entail the concentration of sizeable U.S. naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, but also the large subunits of ground forces sent there along with the proper complement of tanks, antitank weapons, helicopters, artillery and the essential landing craft. Pentagon spokesmen

feel that the use of even the most select assault troops could be successful only on two conditions--firstly, that the personnel can be quickly transferred to the theater of combat, which might be located many thousands of kilometers from the United States, and, secondly, that the personnel have sufficient heavy artillery and experience no material or technical supply difficulties.

In addition to drafting and implementing plans for the quicker transfer of American armed forces to this part of the world, the United States began an all-out study of the possibilities for the more active use of permanent military facilities in this region. People in the Pentagon believe that the Diego Garcia base, which is quite far from the Middle East, will not solve all of the strategic and tactical problems that might be encountered by the American expeditionary corps if it is sent there. Plans were made to find bases and support points located near the Persian Gulf. According to Washington, this could be done in three ways: either the creation of some kind of new alliance under the U.S. aegis to replace CENTO, which would take in Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Oman and some other "conservative" Middle Eastern states, whether on a formal or "informal"--that is, not reinforced by an international legal act--basis; or the acquisition of the corresponding "rights" from certain Middle Eastern states on a bilateral basis; or, finally, a combination of the first two ways.

Although Z. Brzezinski suggested the creation of a "framework of cooperation in the safeguarding of security" in the Persian Gulf zone and Southwest Asia as early as the beginning of 1979, people in Washington have no special illusions regarding the possibility that the Arab countries could now be drawn into a formal military alliance with Israel. The only possible exception to this rule is Sadat's Egypt, which is taking more and more steps to develop contacts with the Israeli expansionists. The latter, on the other hand, are taking an increasingly provocative stand both on the Palestinian question and, in general, on the liberation of occupied Arab territories on the West Bank of the Jordan, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights, or, in short, on the basic problems of Middle East regulation. Apparently the idea of actually putting together some kind of new formal military alliance in the Middle East has been temporarily removed from the agenda by Washington. Quoting high-level government officials, the NEW YORK TIMES wrote in this connection that "the fate of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), which was created under the Eisenhower Administration and was dissolved last year, has made American officials wary of attempts to create an official alliance of pro-Western countries in this region."¹²

The United States is now stressing the acquisition of military bases and other facilities needed for the activity of the American expeditionary corps in the Middle East on a bilateral basis. In this connection, Washington is varying its approach to different groups of nations of interest to it. At least three such groups can be distinguished.

The first taken in Saudi Arabia, Oman and other Persian Gulf countries, as well as Kenya and Somalia--that is, the African countries in the Indian Ocean basin.

The second group will consist of Egypt and Israel--that is, the Middle Eastern countries that have most openly and solidly linked themselves with the policy of American imperialism and are now aspiring to the role of Washington's closest allies in this part of the world.

The third group includes the "peripheral" countries of the region, primarily Turkey and Pakistan, as well as Morocco, the Sudan and Cyprus. The past and present state of Washington's relations with these groups of countries and the methods used by the United States to acquire military bases and support points there differ. This is why it seems expedient to examine U.S. behavior toward each group separately.

Numerous reports in the American press have testified that the "fact-finding mission" at the end of last year, which included representatives of the State Department and Department of Defense, visited Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kenya and Somalia for the purpose of "investigating the possibility of improving U.S. access to military facilities" in these countries. Not one of them, however, openly expressed the willingness to establish U.S. military bases on its territory. In fact, Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia declared in several interviews with Western press organs that his country would never permit the establishment of foreign military bases on its territory and would not offer the use of its military facilities "to the Americans or anyone else." Washington's frenzied search for sites for its military bases continued into 1980.

At the beginning of this year, a new Pentagon delegation went to these countries. This time the delegation specifically examined the condition of air and naval bases in Oman, Somalia and Kenya with a view to their possible use by U.S. armed forces.

According to the delegation's report, its interest was particularly aroused by facilities in the Kenyan port of Mombasa, in the Somali port of Berbera and on Oman's Masira Island, close to the Persian Gulf inlet. Attempting to convince these countries that they should give Washington the right to regularly use their military air and naval facilities, the United States has promised to give them quite extensive military aid. Besides this, it has offered to take on the expense of remodeling and improving the facilities it will be using in Oman, Somalia and Kenya. As a result, the United States was able to essentially come to an agreement with these countries on access to their military bases and the use of their territory in the event of "emergency situations" in the Persian Gulf zone.

As for Saudi Arabia, it has refrained as yet from openly offering the Americans military bases within its territory, particularly in view of the

sharp criticism aroused by the "Carter Doctrine" in the majority of Persian Gulf states.¹³ Although Saudi Arabia "would welcome stronger American military presence in the Middle East and realizes that this would require additional military facilities" and although it is even prepared to help the Americans in the "search for military bases in the Persian Gulf zone," the WASHINGTON POST reported in this connection, it "still has made no move to allow the United States to use military facilities on its own territory." The author of the article explains this country's position by saying that it is "more sensitive to accusations by Islamic and non-aligned countries regarding its willingness to become one of Washington's clients." Nonetheless, in the author's opinion, "Riyadh is now more likely to grant the United States the use of military facilities in this region, although it has no intention of advertising this fact."¹⁴

The possibility of locating bases in Egypt and Israel is quite a different matter. Both of these countries have repeatedly and insistently offered the use of their territory for American military bases. It is evidently no coincidence that former Israeli Foreign Minister M. Dayan frankly declared, immediately after the "peace treaty" between Egypt and Israel had been signed, that this treaty was equivalent to an alliance of Israel, Egypt and the United States. Considering the mood in the Arab world, however, it is precisely this aspect of the separate agreement that Washington does not want to advertise, although it does attach primary significance (particularly now that the shah of Iran has been deposed) to the military capabilities of Egypt and Israel. "The strong armed forces of these countries," J. Carter said in a NEW YORK TIMES interview in August 1979, "now represent the decisive element in the guarantee of stability (naturally, in the American sense--A. K.) in the Middle East."¹⁵

Washington's approach to the use of the military potential and bases of Egypt and Israel, however, is far from uniform. The Sadat regime's claims to the role of regional policeman are openly applauded and encouraged in Washington. In the next 5 years alone, according to the NEW YORK TIMES, the American Administration plans to extend Egypt credit of around 4 billion dollars for the purchase of the most modern weapons,¹⁶ and Cairo's AL-GOMHOURIYA newspaper commented at the end of January 1980, in reference to a statement by Egyptian Minister of Defense and War Production Kamal Hasan Ali, that the Pentagon had approached Cairo with a new business deal, the largest in the entire history of Egyptian-American relations, involving the purchase of weapons and military equipment for a total of over 5 billion dollars.

Washington is not concealing its military ties with Cairo. These ties are not confined to the entry of U.S. naval ships, including aircraft carriers, into Egyptian ports, or to Sadat's promises to put his military bases at the disposal of the United States "if the need should arise." The United States has already conducted joint air maneuvers with Egypt on Egyptian territory, involving the use of the latest and most expensive American

electronic reconnaissance aircraft of the AWACS system, which can be used for air surveillance and monitoring over vast regions. Up to 300 American servicemen were sent to the Egyptian air force base near Luxor to conduct these exercises.

At the same time, Washington is taking a much more cautious approach to the use of bases in Israel at this time because it feels that this could create additional difficulties for the United States in the Middle East by arousing a wave of protest against U.S. actions in the Arab world. "The acceptance of the Israeli offer of bases and other facilities," the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR reported, has been "shelved," as this move "would increase tension in the majority of Islamic states."¹⁷

The United States has also made a more vigorous search for bases for its armed forces in the "peripheral" regions of the Middle East. Particularly noticeable changes have been made in its approach to such countries as Turkey and Pakistan. It is no secret that American-Turkish relations went through a quite difficult period for a number of years after the U.S. Congress imposed an embargo on shipments of weapons to Turkey in connection with its military invasion of Cyprus in 1974. After lengthy negotiations, the two countries initialed an agreement on defense in March 1976, but it has never been ratified. Although around 7,000 American servicemen are still stationed on 26 bases scattered throughout Turkey, the Turkish Government has considerably restricted American possibilities for the use of these bases. In an attempt to regain control over the bases, Washington took persistent steps to regulate its relations with Turkey in January 1980. A high-level American delegation was sent to Ankara with a new draft of the American-Turkish agreement on cooperation in collective defense, with three supplements envisaging the provision of Turkey with subsidies and credit amounting to 450 million dollars in 1980 for the purchase of new weapons and equipment, American assistance in the enlargement of enterprises for the manufacture and repair of several types of military equipment and, what is particularly important to Washington in light of the events in Iran, the use of Turkish bases by the Americans for the collection of intelligence data and, possibly, for operations in the Middle East. All of the documents were signed.

An even more amazing metamorphosis has been undergone in recent months by American-Pakistani relations, which were extremely strained until recently. Although Pakistan and the United States concluded a "joint defense agreement" back in 1959, which is formally still in effect, Washington imposed an embargo on shipments of weapons to India and Pakistan in 1965, after the war between these two countries broke out. It is true that the embargo was gradually relaxed, and that cash sales of weapons to Pakistan, the volume of which averaged less than 100 million dollars a year, were authorized in 1975. In April 1979, however, in connection with reports that Pakistan was building a secret plant for the concentration of uranium, where materials suitable for the manufacture of nuclear weapons could be produced, these weapon sales were completely stopped on the grounds that they were in violation of the provisions of an American law on the

non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Relations between Pakistan and the United States became even more tense. Pakistan, however, continued to work on the production of nuclear weapons. Moreover, on 21 November 1979 the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad and several American consulates and cultural centers in other cities in Pakistan were attacked and destroyed. Nonetheless, on the eve of the new year of 1980, Washington suddenly informed Islamabad, without any kind of requests from Pakistan, of its intention to resume giving Pakistan broad-scale military and economic assistance. Without even waiting for Islamabad's response to this proposal, the President ordered the Pentagon to "expedite" the shipment of 150 million dollars' worth of military equipment previously acquired by Pakistan. Since the beginning of 1980 Washington has been hastily augmenting arms shipments to Pakistan in an attempt to turn this country into a new support point for American imperialism in the Near and Middle East and into a base for aggressive actions against democratic Afghanistan and the USSR. It was even proposed that Congress lift the ban on "aid" to Pakistan without any kind of time limits.

At the same time, people in Washington began the painstaking elaboration of plans to turn Pakistan into the largest U.S. military bridgehead in the Middle East. The accomplishment of American military presence in Pakistan is to begin with flights to Pakistani air force bases by American military planes, which will remain on these bases for increasingly lengthy periods. After this, American ground personnel and the proper equipment will be sent to Pakistan to service these planes. The next phase calls for the entry of Pakistani ports by U.S. naval ships, which will be followed by the stationing of American ground forces in Pakistan on a permanent basis. All of this is supposed to be "legalized" through the revision and supplementation of the American-Pakistani agreement of 1959 with the subsequent ratification of the new agreement by the U.S. Congress.

This is how matters now stand in the search for new bases and support points for the U.S. armed forces in this region on a bilateral basis. In its plans for intervention in the Near and Middle Eastern countries, however, Washington is hoping to rely not only on each of its clients separately, but also on their coordinated action. The greatest hopes have been placed in the agreement of Egypt and Israel to "work out a common strategy," which will certainly be closely linked with U.S. interests. Washington is taking every opportunity to encourage an Islamabad-Beijing "axis"; Beijing is sending weapons and "instructors" to Pakistan.

The present scales of U.S. military activity in the Middle East are still not wide enough for Washington. "I do not think that it would be correct on my part to state that we expect, either now or in the future, to have sufficient military strength and sufficient military presence in the Persian Gulf zone to defend this region unaided," the President said in a talk with a group of American small-town newspaper editors. In order to defend Middle Eastern oil reserves, he continued, the United States is striving to establish military ties with the states in this region, as

well as to "join forces with countries which are not located in this region but are quite strongly dependent, even more than the United States, on its oil."¹⁸

In the military sphere, Washington is relying primarily on England, which recently augmented its military presence in the Middle East by sending sizeable naval forces there, and on France, a large part of whose navy was generally deployed in the Indian Ocean in the past. In the economic sphere, on the other hand, the United States is hoping that its policy in the Middle East will be supported not only by its Western European allies, including the FRG, but also by such countries as Japan and Saudi Arabia, particularly for the rendering of broad-scale economic and financial aid to Turkey, Pakistan and some other countries in this region.

These are the general features of the Middle East aspect of Carter's "new strategy." Summing up the initial results of this strategy, American correspondent H. Smith wrote with some sarcasm that "Jimmy Carter, the preacher of high moral principles in diplomacy, has turned into Jimmy Carter, the executor of a great-power policy."¹⁹ What is more, American observers stress that this is far from a new policy: It is simply the open and vigorous continuation of the same policy which already led the United States into shameful and painful failure in Vietnam. In connection with this, warnings have been voiced in American newspapers. "Does the Carter Administration realize what it is doing in the Persian Gulf?" WASHINGTON POST correspondent J. Kraft asks. President Carter is "playing poker with the Russians in the Middle East without cards," writes American correspondent J. Reston, "and even its closest friends are advising it not to overestimate its capabilities."²⁰

The failure of the piratical diversionary move taken by Washington against the sovereign state of Iran, ostensibly to "save the American hostages," provides more evidence of the validity of this warning. Judging by all indications, however, the present Washington administration intends to continue its adventuristic policy line, which is so dangerous to the cause of peace. Cynically announcing its intention to leave "all possibilities open" for action, it has simultaneously made constant attempts to involve other countries in the anti-Soviet campaign it launched on the pretext of the events in the Middle East. The goals being pursued by the United States are no secret. "Anti-Soviet hysteria became necessary not only so that someone on the crest of this wave could win the presidential election in the fall," said L. I. Brezhnev, analyzing the international situation in his speech to the voters on 22 February 1980. "The main factor here is the U.S. decision to establish a network of American military bases in the Indian Ocean, in the countries of the Near and Middle East and in the African countries. The United States wants to subordinate these countries to its hegemony and to pump their natural resources out of them unimpeded. It could then also use their territory in its strategic intrigues against the socialist world and national liberation forces. This is what all of this means."

FOOTNOTES

1. In the United States the Near East (Middle East, in American terminology) is used in the general sense to designate the region stretching from Afghanistan in the east to Morocco in the west (see, for example, "'Middle East Problems,' Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, May 18 and 20, 1977," Wash., 1977, p 2).
2. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, 2 January 1978, p 1975.
3. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 26 May 1979.
4. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, 28 January 1980, pp 163, 164.
5. THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 24 November 1979.
6. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, 28 January 1980, pp 197, 195.
7. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 28 January 1980.
8. Ibid., 4 February 1980.
9. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 9 July 1979, p 16.
10. PRAVDA, 13 January 1980.
11. THE WASHINGTON POST, 29 January 1980.
12. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 24 January 1980.
13. "In response to Carter's proposal to defend the region with the aid of American military strength," the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR wrote, "some of the leading Arab oil states in the Persian Gulf zone said: 'Thanks, but no thanks.' This gloomy picture was painted by four American experts who had just returned from this region" (THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 4 February 1980).
14. THE WASHINGTON POST, 6 February 1980.
15. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 2 August 1979.
16. Ibid., 21 January 1980.
17. THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 25 January 1980.

18. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 1 February 1980.
19. THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 27 January 1980.
20. THE WASHINGTON POST, 5 February 1980; THE NEW YORK TIMES, 28 January 1980.

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'CONDITIONAL FLEXIBILITY' IN TRADE WITH THE USSR

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 80
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[Article by V. A. Yulin]

[Text] In the first months of 1980 the list of actions by U.S. ruling circles to undermine international detente and deteriorate Soviet-American relations was supplemented by a series of actions which led to the further complication and curtailment of trade, scientific, technical and other contacts with the USSR. The Carter Administration is making a massive effort to use trade as a political instrument in relations with the USSR. The situation now is essentially one in which Washington, having lost its sense of political equilibrium and its realistic view of international affairs, has declared economic war on the Soviet Union.

Is this an "emotional reaction" to the changes taking place in the world or is it a sign of a policy planned long in advance? What effects could this have on the USSR and the United States, on their future relations and on the process of international detente? These questions are now particularly pressing.

I.

The facts testify that the Carter Administration's decision on "economic sanctions" against the USSR does not represent merely an "emotional zigzag" in Washington policy, but the logical continuation of a policy line, planned long in advance and consistently implemented, of using trade and economic ties as an instrument of blackmail and pressure for the sake of attaining specific goals in relations with the socialist countries in general and the USSR in particular.

As we know, the dictatorial policy in trade with the USSR was reflected in recent years in concentrated form in discriminatory legislation passed by Congress (the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1974 Trade Act), according to which the granting of most-favored-nation status to the USSR in trade and governmental credit--that is, the creation of conditions universally

accepted in world practice for mutual trade--was made conditional on the Soviet Union's assumption of commitments totally unrelated to trade. Later, even before the presidential election of 1976, Carter quickly joined forces with the opponents of cooperation with the USSR, assuring Senator Jackson that his amendment would be effectively implemented if the Democratic Administration should take power.¹

After he became President, Carter kept this promise. Throughout his presidency, U.S. relations with the USSR and the other socialist countries in the area of trade have invariably been based on the conditions of the trade and credit legislation of 1974, which elevated discrimination and intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign countries to the status of U.S. government policy. As a result, the present administration's practical line was programmed from the very beginning for the kind of trade with the socialist states that would be devoid of a stable and lasting basis and would be connected with temporary and short-lived factors. The activities of American authorities in this area were distinguished not only by a more pronounced tendency to "politicize" trade and to link it with issues unconnected with trade, but also by attempts to introduce several new features into this "linking policy."

This is how the concept of "conditional flexibility" was born. The fundamentals of this theory were worked out in the depths of the National Security Council under the supervision of Z. Brzezinski and were set forth in Presidential Directive No 18, signed in August 1977. According to S. Huntington, a former official on the council staff, the document stated that "American policy in the sphere of economics should reflect the dual nature of Soviet-American relations, based on cooperation and competition, and the distribution of economic and technical resources between the two countries." The directive prescribed the placing of "economic potential and economic relations at the service of basic American foreign policy goals" and the use of American "advantages along with other means, if necessary, to counterbalance unfavorable Soviet influence in key parts of the world."² When Huntington explained the essence of the President's aim of "conditional flexibility" in trade with the USSR to a group of American businessmen, he said: "The Soviet Union must be given a clear understanding that exports can be stopped or resumed depending on Soviet willingness to cooperate with the United States, whether in Angola or in arms limitation talks."³

Even during the first years of the Carter Administration, there were several signs that this administration was leaning more and more in the direction of confrontation rather than cooperation in trade and economic relations with the Soviet Union.

Above all, it agreed more openly than its predecessors with the U.S. Congress on the "conditions for the normalization" of trade with the countries of the socialist community, and placed major emphasis on the "observance of human rights," particularly in regard to the emigration possibilities of

certain categories of Soviet citizens, regarding them as an exceptionally important criterion for the elaboration of its policy in the area of trade and in other spheres of economic ties and other interrelations with these countries.

What is more, the present administration has considerably expanded the scales of the strategy of linking economic issues with political matters to the very same end--to exert influence on Soviet policy. For example, the American side is insisting with increasing frequency on concessions by the USSR in the matter of strategic offensive arms limitation, the revision of Soviet policy in regard to the African countries and the "improvement of the overall climate"--on American terms--of Soviet-American relations as conditions for the development of trade and economic relations with the USSR. Washington's set of instruments of economic pressure has also been expanded: Now the United States is making not only the granting of most-favored-nation status in trade and government credit conditional upon the USSR's agreement to make concessions, but also certain steps by the American side to develop scientific and technical exchange or trade contacts, including the issuance of licenses for the export of goods stipulated in contracts already signed with American firms.

Besides this, the United States has embarked on the even more pronounced "differentiation" of its approach to individual countries of the socialist community. Whereas Washington is leaning more and more toward a hard line in political, trade and economic relations with the USSR, it is displaying a certain degree of flexibility and a willingness to compromise in relations with other socialist countries. The present "differentiated approach" is essentially a new edition of the "bridge-building" strategy of President Johnson, which was supposed to become a means of influencing domestic political and economic processes in these countries through intensive ideological infiltration under cover of trade.

In addition, the United States, continuing to play the "China card" against the USSR, this time in the economic sphere, suggested the normalization of trade and other relations with China and insisted on granting Beijing most-favored-nation status in trade and credit. A law to this effect was enacted on 1 February 1980.⁴

To "heighten the effectiveness" of its attempts to use trade and credit as economic leverage, the Carter Administration has been more persistent than its predecessors in efforts to draw the Western European countries and Japan into the channel of the discriminatory trade and credit policy of the United States in relations with the USSR and other states in the socialist community.

Finally, when Carter began to reorganize his staff in his first year as President, he paid special attention to the export control mechanism, particularly with a view to augmenting the role of the Department of Defense and the National Security Council in controlling the sale of the latest

technology so as to preclude the possibility of its "leakage" to the socialist states either directly or through third countries.⁵ One of the first symptoms of the tougher line in technology trade was the President's decision in June 1977 to prohibit the sale of the Cyber-76 computer to the Soviet Union for use in meteorological research.

Therefore, the reversal in the Democratic Administration's policy in this area had already acquired almost definite outlines by 1978, when the general features of the unique policy of "flexible response" in trade with the USSR and other socialist countries had taken final shape. It consisted of a set of rigid trade and political measures, now ranging from a total ban (or embargo) on trade or its partial restriction to specific concessions. Arrogantly assuming the right to "punish" sovereign states, the U.S. Government began to implement these measures each time it found or invented a suitable pretext. For example, when spies and renegades were brought to trial in the USSR in July 1978, the U.S. Government took an entire series of restrictive steps against the USSR, including the cancellation of a Moscow visit by the U.S. secretary of commerce and the trip of the U.S. delegation to a regular session of the Soviet-American Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation, the prohibition of the sale of Sperry-Univac computers for TASS, delays in the issuance of a license to the Dresser Industries firm for the export of machine tools that had already been purchased for the production of drilling equipment, and the extension of restrictions on the sale of petroleum and natural gas extraction equipment to the USSR.

Using the events in Afghanistan as a pretext, Washington took new discriminatory steps in the beginning of 1980: It stopped issuing licenses for the export of machines and equipment to the USSR, it restricted sales of U.S. grain, it actually banned exports of textile raw materials and semimanufactured goods, consumer goods, phosphates and superphosphoric acid, it restricted imports of Soviet ammonia into the United States, it disrupted the normal functioning of Soviet-American intergovernmental commissions and it postponed previously planned measures to develop bilateral exchanges and contacts in the economic, scientific, technical and other spheres.

Washington's attempts to use trade as small change in the political maneuvers of detente's opponents naturally had a destabilizing effect on Soviet-American trade. In recent years its development has been extremely erratic. Commodity turnover has become even more imbalanced and its trade structure is becoming deformed. After totaling 2.2 billion rubles in 1976, it dropped to 1.5 billion in 1977 and would have remained on this level for the next 2 years if it had not been for the increase in Soviet purchases, which raised commodity turnover to 1.85 billion rubles in 1978 and 2.8 billion in 1979.⁶ The American authorities did not wish to respond to increased Soviet imports from the United States with broader American purchases in the Soviet market and thereby give mutual trade more balance, so they imposed even stronger restrictions on imports from the USSR, using tariff discrimination and non-tariff barriers. As a result, total Soviet exports to the United States in 1979 were only one-seventh as great as Soviet imports from the

United States (in 1977 the ratio was approximately 1:5, and in 1978 it was 1:6). In view of the U.S. refusal to extend most-favored-nation status to Soviet goods, it does not seem possible to improve the structure of Soviet exports by increasing the proportion accounted for by finished items (primarily machines and equipment)--that is, exports connected with a high level of development and the growth of the export potential of Soviet machine building. Commercial considerations have forced Soviet foreign trade organizations to limit shipments to the United States largely to goods on which customs duties are relatively low or duty-free goods (for example, raw materials). This will not only postpone the achievement of balanced commodity turnover for an indefinite period of time, but will also cause the imbalance to become more pronounced.

The situation that had taken shape by the end of the 1970's indicated that trade growth reserves, accumulated in the form of large transactions concluded prior to the enforcement of the discriminatory U.S. trade and credit restrictions in 1975, had almost been exhausted. The completion of several long-term compensatory projects was delayed by the absence of credit and the impossibility of shipping Soviet goods in compensation due to high customs duties or non-tariff restrictions. Talks with American firms on new large-scale deals reached an impasse when the lack of credit undermined the competitive potential of the offers of these firms.

The American side must have realized that these artificial restrictions would sooner or later bring Soviet-American trade to the verge of decline. But official Washington did not take a single step to prevent this. What is more, it was precisely at this time that it, motivated by the illusion of immediate advantage, made a new assault on this trade with a new embargo and virtually stopped the circulation of goods for some time.

II.

This is not the first time "sanctions" have been used to intimidate our nation. The line of isolation in trade was futile even in those remote days when Soviet Russia was the only socialist country and was surrounded by capitalism. Even then experience was proving that V. I. Lenin was absolutely justified in his remark that "it is not known who it (the economic blockade--V. Yu.) harms the most: those who blockade or those who are blockaded."⁷

In the postwar years, ignoring past experience, American ruling circles tried again to test the strength of the Soviet Union. In 1945, in violation of an existing agreement, the United States actually stopped the shipment of equipment and materials, ordered on lend-lease, to the USSR. The motive was a simple one: It wanted to impede the postwar recovery and development of the Soviet economy. The same purpose was served by other restrictive measures of the cold war period: the institution of rigid control over exports to the USSR in 1948, the embargo on shipments of a broad variety of commodities for "strategic" reasons, the unilateral denunciation by the American side in 1951 of the Soviet-American trade agreement

of 1937, which envisaged, in particular, the granting of most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union in trade with the United States, and so forth. But the results of the cold war policy in the area of international trade did not live up to the expectations of its initiators. Attempts to undermine or impede the economic progress of the USSR were futile. The Soviet State successfully attained its economic objectives and took a leading position in many areas of economics, science and technology.

At the same time, the discriminatory U.S. measures perceptibly injured the interests of American business. By the mid-1950's, Soviet-American commodity turnover had been reduced to the minimum and the United States lost access to the vast and growing Soviet market for a long time. Recalling the "economic war" started by the United States and its followers against the USSR in the 1930's, R. Gilpin, an economist from Princeton University, described it in the following way: "This war was ineffective, had the opposite result and cost the West much more than it cost the Soviets.... If we could not gain anything by imposing sanctions when we were stronger and they were weaker, how can we expect success today?"⁸

Even now there are people in America, however, who, instead of renouncing the dictatorial policy in trade that failed so long ago, are striving to reinforce this policy by spreading lies about the USSR's "inability" to develop its own economy without shipments of American equipment, technology and food. It is no secret, however, that imports of American equipment have never played a deciding role in the formation of the Soviet industrial base. In the first 3 years of the 10th Five-Year Plan, for example, the USSR invested 130.3 billion rubles in equipment, but imported only 1.2 billion rubles' worth from the United States. In other words, equipment purchased in the United States accounted for less than 1 percent of all capital expenditures on equipment in the USSR during this period.

It is precisely with this kind of zeal, worthy of better application, that people in Washington are now trying to estimate the losses we will incur as a result of the U.S. refusal to comply in full with contracts for the sale of American grain. But the cynical calculations concerning the "deterioration" of Soviet food supplies as a result of the American embargo are based on foolish notions about our capabilities and the economic potential of the Soviet Nation. It is known that the USSR is one of the world's largest producers of grain. It is simultaneously a seller and buyer of grain, since the purchase and sale of grain is a normal practice in international trade, particularly in the case of countries with extensive territory. It is more economical, for example, for us to ship grain to the Far East by sea from the United States or other countries than to transport it for huge distances by rail from the Ukraine or Kazakhstan. Let us look at the facts once more. In the first 3 years of the 10th Five-Year Plan, the Soviet Union purchased 32.5 million tons of grain from the United States (primarily fodder grain) while its own grain output during this period amounted to 657 million tons.⁹ At this same time, the USSR annually

exported several million tons of bread grain. These data conclusively testify that our nation has sufficient grain reserves to guarantee the Soviet people a constant supply of bread and baked goods.

The Soviet State has everything it needs to develop its economy, relying primarily on its own strength. Our ability to resist outside economic pressure is much greater now that the USSR is backed up by the other states of the worldwide socialist system and is conducting mutually beneficial trade with 131 countries. Washington's current "economic sanctions" cannot inflict the kind of damage on the Soviet Union that their initiators are obviously expecting. Moreover, these unilateral measures will boomerang against these initiators, if not today then tomorrow.

III.

The fact that the "trade sanctions" against the USSR are hurting U.S. interests more than ours has been admitted by many authoritative representatives of various economic circles in the United States itself. "Restrictions in trade have a self-destructive effect," declared, for example, Bank of America President Clausen. "Under present conditions, this kind of behavior can only have results that are opposite to those desired, and the only losers will be American business and the dollar."

Representatives of the administration, however, including the President, are trying to convince the Americans to the contrary in their public statements. Implying that the USSR is excessively dependent on American shipments, they are trying to strengthen beliefs in the "effectiveness of trade sanctions." For this purpose, they use deliberately exaggerated data on Soviet purchases of grain and keep U.S. public opinion in the dark as to the size of the actual losses these measures will inflict on the American economy.

Nonetheless, Carter had to publicly admit that the curtailment of trade with the USSR would "require all Americans to make sacrifices."¹⁰ More specific acknowledgement was made by Chairman J. White of the Democratic Party National Committee, who announced that the United States would lose more than 5 billion dollars just from the reduction of grain deliveries, and that the government intended to cover part of the losses with budget funds--that is, primarily at the average taxpayer's expense. "The American embargo...will have an extremely tangible effect on the budget of the government and of individual Americans," P. Stewart writes in the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. He then goes on to say: "From the standpoint of the budget, the minimum cost of this political gesture (the embargo--V. Yu.) is equivalent to all federal expenditures on agriculture planned for the coming fiscal year." Moreover, Senator A. Stevenson estimates that the "grain embargo" will mean a 10-percent increase in the federal budget deficit,¹¹ which has been set at 40 billion dollars for the current fiscal year.

Prominent American economist T. Schultz and his University of Chicago colleague D. Johnson feel that these estimates are not high enough. In their opinion, the limitation of grain deliveries to the Soviet Union will have a compound effect on the U.S. economy in the domestic and foreign spheres. For this reason, they take all the various types of outlays into account in their quantitative estimation of total losses. In particular, they include expenditures on government purchases of the grain originally intended for sale to the USSR, amounting to 2.5 billion dollars; the limitation of grain production in the current year and related expenditures of over 2 billion to compensate farmers who plant less grain; the reduction of approximately 2.5 billion in revenues from grain exports in addition to the losses which will result from the sale of grain to other foreign states at lower prices; an additional rise in taxes to finance government programs envisaging the subsidization of farmers in times of poor market conditions for the purpose of guaranteeing them a particular income level; the losses incurred by farmers who have purchased highly productive agricultural equipment in the expectation of increased export grain cultivation; the losses incurred by suppliers of agricultural machinery, seeds and fertilizer in connection with the lower demand for these goods on the farms; the long-term reduction of the demand for grain in the Soviet market.¹²

It is not surprising that when representatives of American farmers' organizations have calculated the actual amount of the losses, they have unanimously declared that Carter has "punished" an important branch of his own nation's economy.

The grain embargo will also have a negative effect on other sectors of the American economy. For example, the losses of transport companies contracted to ship the grain purchased by the Soviet Union have been set at 300 million dollars. Manipulations in the U.S. grain market in connection with the "sanctions" against the USSR over the long range will only intensify the rise in prices and, in the near future, will plague the American consumer with a new rise in the prices of bread and other products. The reduction of grain exports will also have a negative effect on employment in the United States.

It should also be noted that the billions of dollars not received by American exporters would not in any sense have been unnecessary for the U.S. balance of foreign trade, in which a huge deficit has already become a constant factor. This applies not only to grain exports, but also to shipments of other commodities covered by the embargo to the Soviet Union. In the area of machinery and equipment exports, for example, the new restrictions apply to approximately 800 individual licenses issued in 1979 for the export of "highly technological" commodities worth 270 million dollars, as well as around 470 new applications by American firms, which are still being considered, for individual export licenses for a total sum of 150 million dollars.¹³ The decision that was made also prohibits the delivery of equipment for lease or for demonstration purposes and the

"transmission of technical information" and precludes travel by American technical personnel for the installation, maintenance or other servicing of equipment already sent to the USSR.

Summing up all of this in an article entitled "Warring with Trade as the Weapon," the NEW YORK TIMES wrote: "The economic war could be costly for the United States.... The new policy (in trade with the USSR--V. Yu.) can only undermine the position of the dollar even more."¹⁴ According to the DAILY NEWS, the Carter Administration does not plan to compensate the industrial firms that have lost Soviet orders for their losses on the grounds that these are "losses of individual firms."¹⁵

Serious worries are being expressed in American business circles to the effect that the advocates of the "hard line" in government will not limit the prohibitions only to trade with the Soviet Union. "Although administration officials assert that only the controls over exports to the USSR are subject to revision, they are leaving open the possibility that this control will later be extended to all of the Eastern European countries,"¹⁶ the BUSINESS EASTERN EUROPE bulletin states. And BUSINESS WEEK quotes a remark by President J. Grey of the national implement workers union: "We will be excluded from commercial operations with the Soviet Union for some time. But I am worried that American [export] licensing will become even more complicated and American suppliers will be crowded out of other markets."¹⁷

According to the NEW YORK TIMES, representatives of business circles agree that the actions of the Carter Administration have harmed the reputation of the United States as a reliable partner in trade. Indeed, how can a partner with unpredictable be trusted in business? Moreover, the unpredictability of American government policy is now primarily due to the inconsistency and duality of the President's own line. It has not even been 2 years since he publicly announced: "It is most convenient for our nation to trade with the Soviet Union. I believe that the embargos imposed by previous administrations only inflicted extremely great losses on our nation."¹⁸ But today, as we can see, he has returned to a policy which, as he himself admitted, can only have a negative effect on American vital interests. During the 1976 campaign he angrily censured his rival--then President G. Ford--for imposing restrictions on sales of grain to the Soviet Union for "political reasons" in the fall of 1974 and the summer of 1975. "I will never use food as an instrument of pressure," Carter solemnly declared in those days. But as soon as he became President, he apparently made an effort to forget his own assurances and he is now speaking and acting in the cold war spirit. Campaign considerations and an attempt to appeal to chauvinistic circles, judging by all indications, carry considerable weight in the words and actions of the President of a great power, from whom a carefully considered and responsible policy could be expected.

IV.

The United States has done virtually everything to poison American-Soviet trade relations. Now it also wants to spoil the trade relations of other countries, particularly the Western European nations, with the Soviet Union. Washington has long been disrupting the equilibrium of the growing volume and development of trade and economic relations between Western Europe and the USSR, which have helped to strengthen the process of detente. The United States has taken great pains to distort the very meaning of economic cooperation with the USSR, describing it to Western Europeans as a one-sided process which allegedly benefits only the Soviet Union. In 1976, for example, the United States tried to exert pressure on its Western European partners and Japan to standardize Western credit policy in regard to the USSR and other socialist countries. But the agreement concluded within the OECD framework hung in the air because the United States' Western partners deviated from it. To date, Washington has not achieved any of the results it had hoped for from its constant attempts to impose, on its NATO partners, rigid multilateral control over trade with the East through the COCOM channel (the coordinating committee for control over exports to socialist countries), a committee set up under the aegis of this bloc.

"The Europeans want to maintain and develop trade relations with the Soviet Union on terms that are fair to all countries," said American political scientist R. Kaufman. "Export control through the COCOM channel is considered to be outdated, excessive and, in some respects, ineffective.... The idea that the West could use trade leverage against the Soviet Union to influence Soviet policy has been rejected (by the Western European countries--V. Yu.) because it is unrealistic and could have the opposite effect."19

By pushing these countries into confrontation with the East, Washington now hopes that, under the conditions of increased international tension, it will be easier to control its partners, force them to follow in the wake of its own policy and, in particular, support the American "trade sanctions" against the USSR, and simultaneously demonstrate the notorious "Atlantic solidarity." Besides this, by forcing other Western countries to take part in the restriction of trade with the USSR, the United States is inflicting direct losses on its competitors by undermining their commercial operations in the Soviet market.

But Washington's new claims to world hegemony and its attempts to dominate its NATO allies and subject them more totally to its dictatorial authority are being resisted by these allies. "We do not intend to change our trade relations with the USSR"--this statement by French Foreign Minister J. Francois-Poncet was cited by the American magazine TIME, which also pointed out that, with the exception of British Prime Minister M. Thatcher, America's allies in Western Europe were showing a preference "not for solidarity with Washington's rigid series of economic sanctions against

Moscow, but for caution" due to their "fear of endangering the detente in Europe, which they, together with the Soviet Union, have been building for the last 18 years."²⁰ The American weekly magazine BUSINESS WEEK stresses that official and business circles in the Western European countries, particularly France, "are still insisting on the need to maintain commercial relations with the Soviet Union as a means of upholding the process of detente."²¹ Realistic politicians and businessmen in Western Europe have been convinced, by their countries' many years of experience, of the productivity and mutual benefit of all-round cooperation with the USSR under the conditions of detente.

Between 1970 and 1978, Soviet commodity turnover with the Western European states quadrupled and amounted to almost 15 billion rubles in 1978, and to 19.3 billion in 1979.²² The USSR's largest trade partners among these countries are still the FRG, Finland, Italy, France and Great Britain. From the successful development of this trade, businessmen in other parts of the world have seen that Soviet orders stimulate public employment, aid in production development, raise the technical level of production and enhance competitive potential. The repayment of foreign loans with Soviet shipments of scarce raw materials and sources of energy, as is the practice in compensatory transactions, is of indisputable benefit to the capitalist countries under the conditions of the current energy and raw material crisis. Soviet trade and economic relations with the Western European countries are now distinguished by such qualitatively new features as their long-term nature, their broad scales and the development of industrial cooperation. Since the time of the all-European conference in Helsinki, the USSR has already concluded more than 30 long-term agreements with the countries of this region. New agreements and programs for cooperation with a number of these countries are now being drafted.

Under present conditions, the most farsighted Western European politicians and businessmen follow approximately this line of reasoning: "It is one thing when the United States unilaterally curtails its own exports, but it is quite another when it urges other Western countries to deny themselves the benefits and advantages of trade with the USSR." Western European firms are now making use of the additional opportunities to enter the Soviet market which resulted from the cancellation of orders by several American companies under the influence of the U.S. Government's "trade sanctions" against the USSR. In trade, as we know, there can be no "vacuum": Opportunities missed by some traders are seized by others.

Detente in Europe is alive, and its material basis--mutually beneficial trade--is growing stronger. The vital interests of the European people are indissolubly connected with detente and trade in Europe. The Europeans have already experienced the beneficial results of detente and evidently have no wish to cast these results under the feet of those who want to trample them.

The Carter Administration's course of "conditional flexibility" in trade with the USSR is basically defective. It ignores the lessons of the past

and has been built without any real regard for the current international situation. It overestimates the actual capabilities of the United States and underestimates the capabilities of the states against which the United States is imposing certain restrictions.

The steps taken by Washington to curtail trade and economic contacts will not affect the Soviet Union in the way Washington expects, but will deprive American business circles of profitable contracts. Under these conditions, the possibility of a definite structural reorganization of our trade with the West cannot be excluded; this would be a reorganization leading to the augmentation of the proportional share and importance of the particular Western countries which proved their reliability as trade partners of the USSR long ago.

East-West trade should become an important stabilizing factor in peaceful coexistence and the tangible fabric of detente. By unilaterally undermining Soviet-American trade, Washington has created the danger of the destruction of this fabric with all of the related consequences regarding the basis of relations between countries.

The only reasonable course, as L. I. Brezhnev stressed in a conversation with A. Hammer, is the course of detente, arms limitation, mutually beneficial cooperation and a search for mutually acceptable solutions on an honest and fair basis.

FOOTNOTES

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4. EAST-WEST TRADE COUNCIL NEWSLETTER, vol VIII, No 3, 15 February 1980, p 4.
5. The question of control over exports from the United States to the socialist states is discussed in detail in T. V. Kobushko's article in Issue No 3 of the magazine for 1980--Editor's note.
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7. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 44, p 301.
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10. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 5 January 1980.
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CSO: 1803

ECONOMIC BASIS OF THE CRISIS OF CANADIAN CONFEDERATION

**Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 80
pp 38-51**

[Article by N. V. Bogacheva and V. V. Popov]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1803

THE GLOBAL ENERGY PROBLEM AND U.S. POLICY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 80
pp 52-62

[Article by S. V. Tsukanov]

[Text] In the second half of the 20th century, qualitatively new phenomena connected with the rapid development of productive forces and the transformation of science into a tangible productive force in society, began to exert a strong influence on world economics and international relations. In the West, however, the use of the tremendous possibilities of the present technological revolution was restricted by the narrow bounds of capitalism, and as a result of the selfish policies of monopolies it became the source of serious negative effects on society and the environment. A broad variety of these consequences began to make themselves apparent even outside the boundaries of the capitalist states, gave rise to substantial structural changes in the world capitalist economy and exacerbated the global problems of the present day, particularly the problem of energy supplies. "These are absolutely real and extremely serious problems," L. I. Brezhnev remarked. "They will become more acute with each new decade if an intelligent collective solution to these problems, through planned international cooperation, is not found."¹

Energy supplies now constitute an extremely urgent problem for most countries in the world. And this is not surprising: Energy is an essential condition for the very existence of mankind. The existence of abundant and inexpensive sources of energy along with the possibility of its effective conversion represent one of the most important prerequisites for economic progress. It is unlikely that any modern state has not been affected to some degree by the energy problem. For some countries it is a matter of serious concern due to the increasing gap between raw material reserves and growing volumes of energy consumption; others regard it as the chief means of economic growth; and still others are trying to use the current energy situation for their own political purposes.

The variety of forms taken by the energy problem within the bounds of a single state or a single part of the world means that different states have different attitudes toward the problem,² and this can have a significant

effect on the energy situation in a particular country or on the world energy situation. The global energy problem is also having an increasingly noticeable effect on the cooperation and economic competition between socialism and capitalism. Within the capitalist system it represents a source of intense conflict in international relations.

It is not surprising that the world energy situation has been a central matter of concern for several years for scientists, politicians and statesmen.³ It is the subject of conflicting opinions and fierce debates between the developed capitalist nations and the developing countries.

In this article, the author will attempt to assess the influence of the United States on the development of the global energy situation, examining in this connection the basic trends in U.S. domestic and foreign policy in relation to energy.

It would seem that several basic objective causes of the fuel and energy crisis can be singled out, on which the U.S. influence could only have been limited. In the first place, there was the tendency to deplete world energy resources that were most accessible for cheap exploitation. This depletion could be the result of physical, ecological and economic limitations connected with a particular level of development in productive forces. In the second place, there was the shortage of energy resources due to disruptions of international economic and commercial relations in the capitalist world and, above all, the shaky economic ties between its industrial "center" and its raw material "periphery." This is a result, in particular, of the uneven distribution of deposits of mineral fuel on the planet, particularly petroleum, and the increasing lack of correspondence between the geographic location of sources of energy and the location of the centers of its consumption.

Crisis processes of this kind have dramatically complicated relations between the developed capitalist nations and the developing countries. The positions of the United States, which had unlimited access to extremely cheap sources of energy in many developing states in the 1950's and 1960's, were considerably weakened, and this naturally affected U.S. foreign economic and foreign policy strategy.

An important role in the origination and development of the energy crisis was also played by the policy of the oil monopolies, particularly the American ones. For several decades they imposed exaggerated oil consumption on the economy of the United States and other capitalist states, crowding coal out of the economy and preventing the allocation of the necessary funds for the development of new technology in power engineering and the exploitation of new sources of energy. These monopolies, taking advantage of temporary market conditions, began to artificially create a shortage of liquid fuel for the purpose of escalating prices and deriving more and more superprofits.

When we examine the global energy problem, it is difficult to lose sight of the role played by the United States in the development of world power engineering. It is a fact that the American economy accounts for at least 30 percent of all oil consumption in the capitalist world. As the leader of the capitalist states in the area of scientific and technical progress and as the owner of the largest national market, the United States has had, and will continue to have, extremely noticeable influence on the energy situation throughout the world. This influence is of a contradictory nature. On the one hand, the United States is exacerbating the fuel problem by continuing its uneconomical and wasteful consumption of energy raw materials, while on the other, it is pointing out some possible technical solutions to the problem by vigorously conducting scientific research and development.

This contradictory role of the United States reflects the dialectical interconnection between American economic, scientific and technical potential and the global situation in the area of resources. The future domestic and foreign raw material policy of the United States will largely determine conditions in the raw material market, the specific solutions chosen for the energy problem and, to some degree, the development of international economic and political relations. In connection with this, it seems extremely important to assess the general trends in U.S. energy strategy,⁴ which will be far from meaningless for other countries.

One of the ways in which American imperialism is adapting to the new conditions is the attempt to force the world to accept the kind of international division of labor which would strengthen U.S. positions in the world economy. Washington is now linking the attainment of this objective primarily with the creation of a reliable fuel and raw material base for the American economy, drawing from both domestic and foreign sources. The energy upheavals of the 1970's served as a serious warning to the United States regarding the need for timely steps to prevent an energy catastrophe.

The American Government began to display increasing concern and to propose one plan after another for more vigorous action in this field. The administrations of R. Nixon, G. Ford and J. Carter set forth their own energy programs. Hundreds of energy bills were submitted to Congress in the 1970's, a number of large-scale programs were adopted and the system of government energy regulation was reorganized. The basis of these measures was the widely advertised "Independence" program, which was mainly designed to reduce national dependence on imported oil. The assessment of their actual impact calls for the consideration of a broad group of technical, economic and political factors and specific characteristics of the domestic situation in the United States and events in the international arena. Regardless of the specific steps a particular administration chose as the main solutions to the problem, however, its actions essentially represented an admission that the problem had already reached crisis proportions. The government tried to depict the energy problem as a national threat, equally as significant as foreign aggression. In his "policy-planning" speech on

energy problems on 15 July 1979, President Carter called upon the current generation of Americans to "win the war for a solution to the energy problem and restore American unity and confidence during the course of this war.... Energy will be a real test of our ability as a nation to unite forces and, simultaneously, our rallying energy."⁵

Just as the other "shock programs" ("Manhattan," "Apollo" and others) carried out by the United States in the 1930's and 1960's, the Carter Administration's energy program⁶ concentrates on the resolution of acute problems not only within the nation, but also in the international arena. However, whereas the nuclear, space and ecological programs strengthened American positions and drew many other countries closer to the United States--with their technical, economic and administrative potential, aimed at solving problems in the U.S. interest--the energy program demonstrated the weakness of U.S. positions and this nation's obvious inability to substantially reduce its dependence on foreign sources of energy, with all of the ensuing political and economic consequences. It is therefore no coincidence that Carter's energy program includes problems whose resolution presupposes not only personal effort on the part of states and monopolies, but also the maintenance of a specific "modus vivendi" in U.S. political and economic relations with oil-producing states, particularly in the Near and Middle East.

An analysis of the world energy situation by prominent foreign experts testifies that, due to the obviously limited capabilities of the U.S. mechanism of state-monopoly regulation in the energy sphere, it is probable that greater difficulties connected with the implementation of the energy program await the United States in the sphere of international economic relations; this was confirmed by J. Carter in his latest State of the Union Message.⁷ It is true, after all, that the main escalator of the energy crisis in the United States is the shortage of oil and the constantly increasing proportion accounted for by imports in energy consumption: Whereas the United States imported 23 percent of all the oil it used in 1971, and 42 percent in 1976, the figure was already close to 50 percent in 1979.⁸ Statements by some American researchers are of interest in this respect: "By importing more oil than any other country, the United States contributed to the development of three interrelated crisis processes," which are defined as the following: The increasing gap between the demand in the U.S. economy for liquid fuel and the artificially restricted supply of domestic oil helped OPEC to raise prices, institute stricter control over volumes of crude oil exports and strengthen its political influence; the growing U.S. dependence on shipments of oil from the Middle East changed the balance of power in the world arena, and Washington lost several opportunities for bargaining with its allies and trade rivals; the increasing deficit in the U.S. balance of payments weakened the dollar, had a negative effect on world economic growth and amplified the inflationary effect on weaker currencies.⁹

The suspicion that the continuation of this program will not bring about any noticeable improvement in the energy situation is growing among

scientists and politicians, including high-level government officials and congressmen.

Known reserves of oil in the nation, for example, are decreasing. According to the estimates of some experts, if the American economy were to use only domestic oil, its reserves would last for only 5-6 years, given the present rate of consumption.¹⁰

The future energy situation in the United States will depend largely on world oil prices and the lifting of domestic oil price controls in the United States, which should stimulate the monopolies to invest more capital in oil production (naturally, it must be borne in mind that they have always had enough opportunity to increase oil production and earn huge superprofits). There is reason to believe, however, that the United States will continue to conserve its own oil by increasing imports, and that this increase could continue until the end of the 1980's. This is why relations with the Persian Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, which have large reserves and sufficient potential to increase oil production, have become the main object of White House "concern."

The situation with respect to natural gas is equally serious, if not more so, for the United States. Most forecasts, seemingly with good reason, indicate that U.S. reserves can only last for 10-11 years. Natural gas production in 1970-1975 declined sharply while imports increased. The decreasing output of gas was largely a result of artificial underpricing.¹¹ The lifting of government price controls has been planned and is being carried out, and this should give companies more incentive to expand gas prospecting and production operations. Nonetheless, imports of gas, particularly in liquefied form, will continue to grow.

As for coal, the U.S. reserves of which represent 20 percent of world resources, great hopes have been placed in this fuel since the beginning of the 1970's. Its broader use was supposed to alleviate the strain in the oil and gas market. Plans were made to convert virtually all heat and electric power stations from liquid fuel and gas to coal, and to use coal more intensively in the home. Nonetheless, many American heat and electric power stations are still operating on liquid fuel and gas. One reason can be found in existing environmental protection standards, which make the use of coal difficult unless electric power stations are equipped with air pollution prevention systems. But the main reason is that the structure of the U.S. economy is tightly linked with oil and gas. It would be extremely difficult to reorganize this structure, as this would require tremendous effort, time and resources, which would have a negative effect on the competitive potential of American industry.

Nuclear power engineering, which was regarded as a realistic alternative, if not the only one, to energy hunger in the United States, is experiencing serious difficulties. The predictions that nuclear power plants would be producing 22 percent of all electrical energy consumed at the end of the 1970's did not come true. By the beginning of 1980 the existing nuclear

plants in the nation were producing only 12.5 percent of all electrical energy. Moreover, many orders for nuclear reactors have been cancelled or postponed in recent years, attesting to unfavorable prospects in this field in the near future. Predictions regarding nuclear power plant capacities for 1985 are already being revised. The Department of Energy expects total capacity to reach only 106,000 milliwatts at best by this time, instead of the earlier estimate of 300,000. This actually cancels out the government's intention to cover 30 percent of the national demand for electric power with nuclear energy by 1985.¹²

The futility of this extremely ambitious national energy program, including its latest variant, worked out by the Carter Administration, was pointed out by many specialists and scientists even at the moment of its birth. The goals it pursued were inconsistent not only with the objective conditions of the development of the American energy industry, but also with the very purpose of capitalist production, consisting mainly in the acquisition of maximum profit within the shortest possible period of time.

It would be virtually impossible to restructure the fuel and energy reserves (by means of conversion from oil to coal or other energy resources) in a large economy like the American one within 5 or 10 years. The time lag in industrial development, the selfish policies of monopolies, the influence of defenders of the environment and the American way of life itself with its characteristic wasteful consumption of energy--these factors would severely complicate the accomplishment of radical changes in the national energy situation within the near future.

In fact, the development of a large oil-and gas-bearing region requires from 8 to 10 years, the construction of a nuclear power plant can take up to 9-11 years and the establishment of a large mine can take 7 or 8 years. It would also be unrealistic to expect noticeable changes in the transportation system in the 1980's that might considerably reduce the demand for liquid fuel. The future of battery-operated vehicles is still quite uncertain. Technological problems connected with breeder and thermonuclear technology have not been completely solved. The development of solar energy is also a matter for the extremely distant future.

What is more, the energy program envisages appropriations exceeding 141 billion dollars in the 1980's.¹³ This is a much higher figure than the one specified in "Project Independence." According to the estimates of American experts, however, actual expenditures will most probably be two or three times as great. In addition, due to the absence of a state sector in the United States and the dominant position occupied by private capital, the fate of any energy program actually lies not so much in the hands of government (even if it should be prepared to conduct a policy in the broad public interest) as in the control of monopolies, motivated by the desire to maximize profits.

Besides this, the U.S. Government's course toward energy independence is contrary to the system of international capitalist division of labor, which

accustomed the American economy to the increasing consumption of cheap foreign energy resources and impeded the exploitation of oil, gas and coal deposits on the national territory of the United States. Only strategic considerations, the increase of anti-imperialist feelings in the developing countries, accompanied by a rise in raw material and fuel prices, are forcing the United States to reassess its traditional foreign economic policy. The modification of this policy is a compulsory action, which many representatives of American business and government circles would prefer to regard as temporary, rather than as a general trend of a long-term nature. For this reason, in spite of its numerous plans and programs, the United States is now assigning priority to the resolution of the difficult energy problem, which will involve enormous expense, not within its own national economy, but outside its boundaries. It will be more convenient for the United States to continue importing oil (even at higher prices) than to reorganize its internal energy (and, consequently, transportation) system. The establishment of reliable supplies of imported oil (400-500 million tons) throughout the 1980's and the use of this time to develop new energy sources for the purpose of actually achieving energy independence--this would seem to be the long-range goal of American state-monopoly capitalism in the area of energy supplies for its economy.

Carter's energy program, just as the programs of his predecessors, is largely in the nature of recommendations rather than a guide for action for monopolistic capital, which is no hurry to invest funds in costly projects. For this reason, the goal of reducing oil imports to 200 million tons a year by the end of the 1980's seems dubious and virtually impracticable.

It is obvious, therefore, that radical changes in the American fuel and energy balance will not be shaped by temporary market conditions, but by objective economic tendencies. These tendencies testify that the United States is not likely to have any alternative to the importation of liquid fuel on a broad scale in the next 20-25 years. This explains the motives for the periodic statements by the American Administration, which represent overt encroachment upon the oil resources of Iran and other Persian Gulf states. These statements often include the threat that the United States will do everything within its power to attain its goals, particularly those connected with the acquisition of unlimited access to sources of petroleum in this region.

The serious intention of U.S. political leaders to seek ways of satisfying the nation's need for oil and other energy and mineral resources outside the nation is consistent with the theory of "interdependence," which was set forth in the beginning of the 1970's and actually signified the admission of the U.S. economy's growing dependence on foreign raw materials, primarily the raw materials of the developing countries.¹⁴ We should recall that the theory of "interdependence," which became one of the most important elements of American foreign economic and energy strategy, was elaborated with consideration for unfavorable, for the United States, conditions in the world economy, particularly with respect to raw materials.¹⁵

Former U.S. Secretary of State H. Kissinger admitted in one of his public statements: "Our interdependence on this planet is becoming the central factor in our diplomacy. Energy, resources, the environment, the use of outer space and the seas--all of these are problems with positive and negative consequences transcending national boundaries. They carry the seeds of political conflicts for future generations, they challenge the abilities of the international community and they make new demands on our world view and on government leadership."¹⁶ It is no secret, however, that the "new demands on our world view," from the vantage point of contemporary American foreign policy theorists, look like a desire to exert pressure on other countries to ensure the "normal functioning" of the American economy.

The main objective of the strategy of "interdependence" is not confined to the energy sphere and essentially consists in the attainment of the following important goals: the creation, under U.S. supervision, of a strong and reliable network of foreign economic ties between the West and the developing countries, firmly securing them within the orbit of the developed capitalist states and making it difficult for them to choose an independent course of development; the strictest possible limitation of the scales of socialist influence in the world economy, particularly with respect to the OPEC countries and the Middle East zone. American political leaders and experts on various aspects of foreign policy have pointed out the need to work out a mechanism, which would ensure the exploitation of the natural resources of other countries, and to conduct a broad "national policy of creating reserves of particularly important types of resources to cover civilian and military needs in times of crisis."¹⁷

The theory of "interdependence" also indicates the intention to make energetic use of the results of technological progress, food and other elements of American economic potential, in which the developing countries have expressed an interest, as a "bargaining point" to ensure U.S. access to the resources of other countries.

New international organizations in the capitalist world, in the creation of which the United States has displayed considerable initiative in recent years, striving to secure the possibility of exerting as much pressure as possible on their daily activity, are also supposed to promote U.S. access to world sources of energy. In connection with this, we should recall that in 1974 the 12 capitalist countries which are the leading consumers of oil reached a preliminary agreement, on the basis of Washington's guidelines, to reduce their domestic oil consumption 7-10 percent in the event of new energy crises. This agreement also envisages the accumulation of oil reserves, which are supposed to be turned over to a special pool. Here it should be borne in mind that one of the largest Western European states, France, refused to subscribe to any such agreements.

One of the results of this activity was the creation of the International Energy Agency, with 20 oil-importing developed capitalist countries making

up its membership. The United States did not limit itself to the creation of a mutual support mechanism only in the area of oil deliveries. The new agency is also supposed to coordinate the combined efforts of the members in the field of energy conservation and organize joint research projects to develop new sources of energy. It should be stressed that, in this international agency, decisions are made on the basis of a proportional voting system, in which the United States has 30 of the total 148 votes. The adoption of decisions requires 89 votes, or 60 percent. This means that Washington, with the support of just a few satellite countries, can easily block any decision not to its benefit. Nonetheless, the last 5 years have shown that disagreements between the United States and its allies on energy questions have not only not been overcome, but have even been considerably exacerbated. The struggle in the world capitalist oil market is becoming increasingly fierce. Under these conditions, the problem of ensuring the reliability of liquid fuel shipments has become a matter of primary concern for the United States. The accomplishment of this vitally important task is being complicated by the fact that increasing quantities of imported oil come from a region seized by anti-American feelings, which is the situation today in the Persian Gulf.

Correspondingly, within the framework of the general theory of "interdependence," we can distinguish between specific U.S. policy lines toward the countries or regions richest in energy resources.

Canada and Venezuela, the traditional and reliable suppliers of oil in the Western Hemisphere, have noticeably reduced their shipments to the United States in recent years. What is more, Canada has warned Washington that it will completely cease to supply its southern neighbor by 1982. Venezuela, which has embarked on the nationalization of its oil resources, also intends to reduce the level of oil exports each year. The great hopes associated by the American Government with a considerable increase in Mexican oil deliveries are still unjustified. Carter's latest talks with President J. Portillo did not lead to a significant increase in oil imports from Mexico. Under these conditions, the significance of oil deliveries from the states in the Eastern Hemisphere has grown dramatically. In 1975, Saudi Arabia and Nigeria had already pushed Venezuela and Canada into third and fourth place, respectively, in exports of this raw material to the United States. But Nigerian production capacities have reached their limit. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, has sufficient potential to continue increasing its oil output. Possessing approximately 27 percent of all known oil reserves in the capitalist world, this country is capable of increasing liquid fuel production to 1 billion tons a year, which would more than cover the needs of the American economy. But the development of anti-imperialist tendencies in this region, which brought about, for example, the fall of shah's regime, could also overtake other Persian Gulf countries. It is precisely this course of events that U.S. ruling circles find extremely disturbing.

The facts indicate that the Persian Gulf is becoming the target of direct claims and of the global strategy of Washington in general. The attempt to gain control over the richest oil deposits in the world and the frank desire to limit Soviet influence as much as possible are the characteristics of American imperialism's present tactic. The energy policy of the White House in the 1970's was closely interconnected with the military policy of this nation in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean basin.

By relying on Iran, Washington hoped to insure itself against the consequences of international political crises, not only in the Persian Gulf zone but in the Middle East in general. The possibility of a new embargo by the oil-producing states is regarded by influential Washington circles as an extremely serious threat to the United States. Many prominent American politicians, particularly E. Kennedy and M. Mansfield, have repeatedly warned that Washington's dangerous course of stimulating the arms race in this part of the Asian continent could have catastrophic results. "It is doubtful that our (American--S. Ts.) shipments of arms to the Persian Gulf states will guarantee us substantial influence, not to mention control over the use of these weapons"¹⁸--this is how Senator Kennedy assessed the Pentagon's adventuristic policy. His prediction, just as the view of other realistic politicians, has been completely confirmed: An anti-imperialist, antimonarchic revolution broke out in Iran as a result of several objective causes, and relations between Tehran and Washington took on the nature of pointed hostility and conflict. In 1980 shipments of Iranian oil to the United States were completely terminated. Washington responded to the Iranian oil embargo with a food embargo, armed provocation and the freezing of Iranian accounts in American banks. In this explosive situation, the Carter Administration decided to exert direct economic, political and military pressure on Iran. Considering the present state of events, the possibility of the extreme exacerbation of the situation in the Persian Gulf cannot be excluded.

The aggravation of the energy problem in the last third of the 20th century led to an intensive search for scientific, technical and economic solutions in the United States and several other countries. This approach could be regarded as constructive if it were free of the discriminatory and neocolonialist line of the capitalist countries. The United States and its allies, however, are conducting the search for ways of overcoming the energy crisis quite inconsistently. The ensuing negative tendencies in the world economy are all that could have been expected. At their basis lie objective factors of capitalist development, including, in particular, the uneven economic development of different states and the unequal political and economic relations between states and regions in the capitalist world.

The concentration of productive forces, scientific and technical knowledge and financial resources in the developed capitalist states, which do not have an adequate mineral and raw material base to satisfy their own constantly rising demand for fuel and raw materials, on the one hand, and the

existence of rich mineral deposits in the developing countries, which have displayed a relatively insignificant demand for them, on the other, explain the difference in approaches to the fuel and raw material problem. The United States is trying to answer this question by relying on its own scientific, technical, economic and military potential and on the capabilities of a limited group of imperialist states, exclusively with a view to its own interests. It would seem that this approach could have serious consequences. Indeed, if the United States should strive to seize control over sources of energy and crude mineral resources and to regard the development of alternative energy sources as a means of reducing its dependence on raw material shipments from the developing countries and as an instrument for the exertion of direct pressure on them, these countries might intensify the process of the creation of raw material "anti-cartels" and impose general embargos on the raw materials and fuel needed by the United States, using them as economic and political leverage in dealing with the Western powers. The young states of Asia, Africa and Latin America do not want to play their traditional role of raw material annexes of the West. Their program for the establishment of a "new international economic order" envisages guaranteed sovereignty over their own natural wealth, the reassessment of prices and revenues from sales of raw materials and fuel, and the right to form associations of mineral resource producers and exporters. The developing countries have actually already counter-balanced the West's imperialist integration within the framework of the International Energy Agency with several raw material cartels, which have become an important factor in world politics and economics.

Under these conditions, the United States has had to resort to maneuvers and even compromises in its foreign economic policy. Now that it has lost direct control over the natural resources of the majority of developing countries, the United States is trying to impose a more sophisticated system of neocolonialism on the young states under the banner of "technology transmission." But these efforts are doomed to fail. No recipes for the achievement of harmonious interests within the capitalist framework can eradicate the defects of the bourgeois society. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that current American policy will give rise to new, equally serious problems, such as the danger of open confrontation over mineral resources, economic and trade wars, stronger inflationary processes, arms race escalation, and so forth.

This makes it even more obvious that the successful resolution of the global energy problem will not be the result of only scientific and technical progress or, naturally, "gunboat policy," but will depend largely on egalitarian and mutually beneficial cooperation and concerted effort by many states with differing levels of production development and differing social structures. In essence, the eradication of the energy problem will, in our opinion, not only necessitate its principled scientific and technical resolution, but also the extensive use of the results in the interests of all mankind. Whereas the importance of the first objective is inarguable, the role of the second is often underestimated in the West. But

experience has proved that it is sometimes easier to make an important scientific discovery than to find the necessary mutual understanding and arrange for mutually beneficial international cooperation.

When global problems are being solved, it is impossible to pursue only national interests while ignoring the interests of other states. Whereas the industrial states will make the greatest contribution to the long-range resolution of energy problems, the conditions in which the developed capitalist countries can carry out their plan for economic and technological development now depend largely on the policy of the developing states, which possess the natural resources needed by the economies of the developed capitalist countries.

The world is entering the last two decades of the 20th century, during the course of which several cardinal scientific and technical tasks will have to be accomplished and new technology in the areas of power engineering and the use of resources will have to be mastered. This will require the colossal concentration of resources and efforts, which might obviously be insufficient in the event that the United States continues its policy of aggravating conflicts between the capitalist developed nations and the developing states and increasing international tension. As long as the world population is divided by political conflicts and engrossed in an arms race which absorbs colossal scientific, technical, material and financial resources, it will be unable to solve global problems in their entirety. In connection with this, the struggle to strengthen detente is becoming even more important; it is only under the conditions of detente that the broadest and most effective mutually beneficial economic, scientific and technical cooperation can be organized.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 3 November 1977.
2. A detailed analysis of the U.S. approach to today's global problems can be found in the collective monograph "Global'naya strategiya SShA v usloviyakh nauchno-tekhnicheskoy revolyutsii" [The Global Strategy of the United States Under the Conditions of Technological Revolution], Moscow, 1979, ch 6.
3. Many serious studies by Soviet and foreign scientists and international groups of experts on various aspects of the world energy problem were published in the 1970's. They include "Energeticheskiy krizis v kapitalisticheskoy mire" [The Energy Crisis in the Capitalist World] (edited by Ye. M. Primakov), Moscow, 1975; Yu. A. Yershov, "Syr'ye, toplivo, politika" [Raw Materials, Fuel and Politics], Moscow, 1975; L. Rocks and R. Runyon, "The Energy Crisis," N.Y., 1972; D. Hayes, "Rays of Hope. The Transition to a Post-Petroleum World," N.Y., 1977; "Energy: Global Prospects, 1985-2000," N.Y., 1977; "World Energy Outlook," Paris, 1977.

4. Several aspects of this problem are examined in the article by Yu. V. Kurenkov and K. I. Mangushev in Issue No 1 of our magazine for 1980--Editor's note.
5. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, 20 July 1979, p 1238.
6. It is examined in detail in Issue No 11 for 1979--Editor's note.
7. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, 28 January 1980, pp 194-200.
8. MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW, February 1980, p 14.
9. THE BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, November 1979, p 7.
10. WORLD ENERGY SUPPLIES, United Nations, 1973-1978, No 22, N.Y., 1979.
11. See "Energeticheskiy krizis v kapitalisticheskom mire," p 272.
12. ATOM WIRTSCHAFT, vol 24, No 10, 1979, p 459.
13. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 30 July 1979, pp 19-20.
14. "Project Independence: USA and World Energy Outlook to 1990," Wash., 1977, p 3.
15. For more detail, see the article by A. A. Kokoshin, "'Interdependence': Realities, Theories and Policy," in Issue No 1 for 1977--Editor's note.
16. "The Secretary of State Speech, July 14, 1975," Wash., 1975, p 2.
17. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 12 February 1975.
18. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1975, p 28.

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CSO: 1803

AMERICAN PHYSICIANS IN THE CRIMEAN WAR

**Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 80
pp 63-69**

[Article by N. N. Bolkhovitinov and V. N. Ponomarev]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1803

NUCLEAR ARMS PROLIFERATION: DANGEROUS MANEUVERS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 80
pp 70-73

[Article by V. F. Davydov]

[Text] When the news of Washington's willingness to give Islamabad military and economic assistance was reported at the beginning of the year, foreign policy analysts hastily concluded that this would heighten the probability of Pakistan's evolution into a nuclear power.

We should recall that in April 1979 the Carter Administration announced that, on the basis of the 1976 "Symington Amendment," the United States would stop giving economic and military assistance to Islamabad as it was displaying all the signs of increased efforts to develop nuclear weapons. The NEW YORK TIMES then commented that Washington regards Pakistan as "the next candidate for membership in the nuclear club" and therefore intends to make every effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear arms. Now, however, in 1980, the United States is actually encouraging Islamabad's nuclear ambitions by its own behavior. "The resumption of American assistance will give Pakistan a chance to use its previously limited means to carry out the once prohibited program for the creation of nuclear weapons," the WASHINGTON POST commented.

In terms of the completion of its nuclear program, Pakistan has long been categorized by Western experts as a "near-nuclear" or "threshold" country. Islamabad's nuclear program began to be developed during the cold war years, when Pakistan was viewed as a key country in imperialism's aggressive preparations in Asia and as one of the chief members of the CENTO bloc. It was from this territory that American U-2 planes took off for reconnaissance flights over the USSR. In 1954, behind the screen of the "Atoms for Peace" campaign launched by the Eisenhower Administration, a bilateral agreement on cooperation in the use of atomic energy was signed. In accordance with this agreement, Washington consented to the delivery of a 5-megawatt research reactor to Pakistan. In 1965 Canada sent Pakistan a 137-megawatt heavy water reactor, which was totally dependent on nuclear fuel imported from the United States.

The intensive training of personnel for the atomic industry began at the same time. Pakistani specialists were trained in the United States, Canada, the FRG and other countries. The United States alone trained 135 Pakistani nuclear physicists.

In the 1970's Pakistani ruling circles resolved to create a widely diversified atomic industry, including not only nuclear power plants but also enterprises for the production of nuclear fuel. In 1975 it was announced that a 600-megawatt reactor would be built in the early 1980's and that another 10 reactors of this type would be built by the end of the 20th century. In 1976 Pakistan signed an agreement with France on the purchase of an enterprise for the regeneration of spent fuel, the operation of which would produce fissionable material--plutonium-239--suitable for the creation of explosives.

Although Islamabad's official explanation was that the acquisition of this equipment costing 180 million dollars was essential for the satisfaction of its growing energy needs and for the "independent" supply of breeders planned for the future with nuclear fuel, Western experts took a different view. They believed that the establishment of plutonium regeneration enterprises was the shortest route to nuclear arms manufacture. Columbia University Professor Z. Khalilzad, for example, wrote the following: "The Pakistani leaders realized long ago that a peaceful nuclear program can bring their nation closer to the creation of nuclear potential and conceal their actual goal--the implementation of a corresponding military program." This conclusion was corroborated by Pakistan's stubborn refusal to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968) and the Moscow treaty on the banning of nuclear tests in the three spheres (1963). Besides this, Pakistani ruling circles repeatedly stressed, with veiled references to India, that if any neighboring non-nuclear countries should conduct nuclear tests, "the people of Pakistan may end up eating grass" but they will do the same.

In view of the fact that the Franco-Pakistani atomic transaction aroused pointed concern in the world public, Paris tried to modify the original agreement throughout 1977 and 1978 by proposing to Islamabad the joint operation of nuclear fuel regeneration equipment. Pakistan, however, did not accept this proposal and insisted on the original terms of the agreement. As a result, the agreement has never been implemented.

While the international debates were going on over the plutonium regeneration plant, Pakistan began to work in earnest on another plan--a plan to open enterprises for the derivation of enriched uranium-235, just as suitable as plutonium-239 for the production of nuclear weapons. As we know, for this purpose Islamabad instituted secret operations through dummy firms to purchase the necessary materials from the United States, England, the FRG, Switzerland and other Western countries. In 1979 it was discovered that Pakistan had been able to purchase the necessary equipment with the direct connivance of the Western countries, the United States prominent

among them, and what is more, to gain access to the necessary uranium enrichment technology by the centrifuge method, used by the URENCO consortium. It also became known at that time that shipments of uranium ore to Pakistan had been delivered in secret from Niger through SOMAIR, the international consortium.

The Italian weekly EUROPEO reported in November 1979 that "Pakistan's atom bomb is almost ready," and the London SUNDAY TIMES remarked that tests "might already be scheduled for 1980." Information about the threat of nuclear proliferation in connection with Islamabad's activity was known in UN circles just before the beginning of the 34th Session of the General Assembly in 1979.

How did the United States react to Pakistan's nuclear ambitions? Unfortunately, Washington did not display the kind of consistency demanded by the interests of nuclear non-proliferation.

This is clearly attested to by the reversals of its "nuclear conflicts" with Islamabad, which took place in the second half of the 1970's. When the fact that the Franco-Pakistani agreement had been signed became known in 1976, then U.S. Secretary of State H. Kissinger went to Islamabad to try to force Pakistan into renouncing the planned bargain. According to the press, in talks with former Pakistani Prime Minister A. Bhutto, Kissinger warned that the United States would terminate all military aid to Pakistan and would institute sweeping economic sanctions if Pakistan did not cancel the deal with France. At the same time Washington indicated that it might renounce the embargo on the shipment of modern weapons, which had been imposed back in 1965 at the time of the Indo-Pakistani conflict, if Islamabad should reconsider its decision regarding its nonparticipation in CENTO.

By this time Congress had passed the "Symington Amendment" to the act on economic and military aid, which demanded the termination of cooperation with allied and friendly countries in the event that they should acquire plutonium regeneration and uranium enrichment plants. In fact, this began to be used in the vicious practice of bargaining over the acquisition of nuclear technology by the developing countries, which, in the case of Pakistan, boiled down to attempts by Washington to force Islamabad to take part in the Pentagon's aggressive plans in Asia.

After the Bhutto government was overthrown in 1977, Washington continued to bargain with Pakistan, still refusing to deliver the ordered 110 A-7 bombers. A special group headed by J. Smith was even formed within the State Department to plan, according to reports in the press, a "last desperate attempt to keep Pakistan from embarking on the production of nuclear weapons." On the one hand, plans called for such punitive measures as sweeping economic sanctions, including the restriction of American capital investments and the blocking of subsidization by the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

What is more, the U.S. press even reported that the State Department was seriously considering the possibility of solving the problem by military means--by sending in an American landing force and destroying the uranium enrichment enterprises erected near Rawalpindi. On the other hand, transparent hints were made to Pakistan that it could receive extensive military assistance, acquire modern F-15 and F-16 aircraft and even expect direct U.S. support for Islamabad's policy in South Asia--on the condition that this policy would correspond to goals set by Washington. After the revolutions in Iran and Afghanistan, Islamabad raised the stakes in its bargaining with Washington because, in the opinion of the military regime in Pakistan, Washington had no one it could rely on more in its strategic preparations in South Asia, begun on the pretext of the events in Afghanistan and directed against the USSR and the independent countries in this region. In particular, Islamabad began to bargain with Washington over the amount of the proposed U.S. military assistance, declaring that it was "too small."

Regardless of the outcome of Islamabad's bargaining process with Washington, the very fact that the United States offered Pakistan military assistance must be regarded as encouragement of the Pakistani leadership's nuclear plans. The question arises: Is Washington gravitating toward agreement with the advocates of the exertion of "forceful" pressure on the USSR, who feel that it is not in the U.S. interest to suppress the nuclear ambitions of "threshold" countries belonging to the capitalist world, particularly those situated closest to the USSR.

According to these strategists, the U.S. worries over the question of whether nations located near the Soviet Union will or will not acquire nuclear weapons are unwarranted from the standpoint of geopolitical considerations. As early as March 1977, ANNALS magazine printed the following inflammatory statement: "Non-proliferation (of nuclear weapons--V. D.) in South Asia is of negligible interest from the standpoint of U.S. security; the chief danger lies in the possibility of the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations." The circles adhering to this view are advising a closer alliance with the PRC, ignoring what they regard as the secondary issue of nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia. Commenting on the new tendencies in the Carter Administration's policy which agree with this view, the NEW YORK TIMES reported in a disturbed tone on 6 February 1980 that geopolitical considerations of competition with the USSR had prevailed over non-proliferation considerations in Washington. As the newspaper indicated, "for Brzezinski the question of whether Pakistan will set off a nuclear bomb is trivial in comparison to the objective of mobilizing this region against the Soviet threat."

This approach will ultimately endanger international security in general and the security interests of the United States itself, as the "spread" of nuclear weapons throughout the world will heighten the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war. The latest measures taken by Washington, as L. I. Brezhnev noted, "are equivalent to serious policy errors. Like a boomerang they will sooner or later strike back at their initiators."

'EARTH DAY.' DAY OF CONCERN

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 80
pp 73-76

[Article by V. I. Sokolov and G. S. Khozin]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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STATE AND LOCAL TAXES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 80
pp 77-81

[Article by N. S. Vetrova]

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LOOKING FOR ARMS BUYERS

**Moscow SSIA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 80
pp 82-87**

[Article by N. S. Krotovskaya]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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THE WASHINGTON PAY-OFF

**Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 80
pp 88-101**

[First installment of translation by A. A. Arzumanov of chapters from the book "The Washington Pay-Off; A Lobbyist's Own Story of Corruption in Government" by Robert N. Winter-Berger, New York, 1972, Lyle Stuart, Inc.]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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SUPER-COMPUTERS IN THE UNITED STATES

**Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 80
pp 102-110**

[Article by A. P. Kochur]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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BOOK REVIEWS

Autos and Energy Crisis

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 80
pp 111-113

[Review by B. P. Sitnikov of the book "Running on Empty. The Future of the Automobile in an Oil Short World" by Lester R. Brown, Christopher Flavin and Colin Norman, New York-London, W. W. Norton and Co., 1979, 116 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

World Food Crisis

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 80 p 113

[Review by I. B. Avakova of the book "World Hunger. Ten Myths" by Frances Moore Lappe and Joseph Collins, San Francisco, Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1979, 72 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

Journalist's View of 1970's America

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 80 p 114

[Review by I. A. Geyevskiy of the book "Glyadya na Ameriku" (Looking at America) by Vitaliy Kobyshev, Moscow, Izvestiya, 1979, 271 pages]

[Text] This book is a journalistic chronicle of the 6 eventful years (1973-1978) the author spent in New York as an IZVESTIYA correspondent. In his reports the author distinguishes the main trends and focuses attention on events reflecting long-range tendencies.

The author consistently and conclusively demonstrates how the development of the detente process aroused the hope of real escape from the danger of war and of stronger mutually beneficial cooperation between the United

States and USSR in Americans of different social positions--from workers and farmers to the presidents of large corporations and members of Congress. But the author also always kept an eye on those who opposed the normalization of Soviet-American relations and detente in general from the very beginning. The members of this "host," as the author points out, have a feature in common--the willingness to use any means to undermine the process of detente in their own selfish interests (p 27).

The author notes that the campaign to undermine detente was joined by officials long ago. The decisions made soon after the Carter Administration came to power--regarding the production of neutron bomb components and cruise missiles, etc.--represent a carefully planned policy line. "A dangerous game has been started in Washington. People there are returning to the already failed policy of fueling a cold war, intensifying the arms race and escalating international tension" (p 55). This would seem to have been written yesterday, but actually the words are taken from a news report sent in by the author in July 1977.

The author has also examined the basic outlines of the administration's domestic policy and its style of national leadership. When the new President came to the White House, he wore an ordinary sweater for a "fireside talk" with the television audience and even spent the night in the home of an "average American." All of this was depicted as a form of "getting back to the people" and responding to their wishes. But the book containing the presidential candidate's campaign promises is rarely read in the White House, V. Kobyshev writes, and many of its pages will most likely never be cut (p 46). This was written in May 1977. It was also at that time that the author made the following statement: "All of this does not look like a simple failure to keep promises, but like a total departure from the campaign platform" (p 48). The entire course of subsequent events also confirmed this conclusion.

The subject matter of the book is broad and diversified--the energy crisis, the Mafia, the persecution of dissidents, the dirty operations of special services....

The author's reports of meetings with prominent Americans are also successful--his meetings with Reverend Ben Chavis, Communist Party veteran Simon Jackson and many others.

Kobyshev's book will be of indisputable interest not only to those who daily study U.S. domestic affairs and foreign policy, but also to the general reading public.

Canadian Economics and Politics Today

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 80
pp 114-115

[Review by G. A. Arganat of the book "Kanada na poroge 80-kh godov. Ekonomika i politika" (Canada on the Threshold of the 1980's. Economics and Politics), edited by L. A. Bagramov, Moscow, Nauka, 1979, 400 pages]

[Text] Several serious studies of the history, economy, geography, population and culture of Canada have been published in the Soviet Union in the last 15-20 years. But almost all of them have dealt with individual, although major, problems in national development. Many of the factual data in these books are outdated. At the same time, Canada is one of the nations whose development is extremely dynamic.

The subject of this review is essentially the first comprehensive study of Canada's economic and political development in Soviet literature. This was not an easy task since Canada is a "complex" country, which is distinguished by a fairly high level but is nonetheless excessively dependent on a stronger power--the United States. This thesis is the basis on which the study is built.

The 12 chapters of this collective work deal with the nation's most urgent problems. Each of them will give the reader new information and a new outlook on certain issues.

The chapters pertaining to the peculiarities of economic development and the dominant position of foreign capital describe the most important phenomena and processes characteristic of Canada in the 1960's and 1970's. They illustrate the role of American capital in Canadian economics and the related multitude of Canadian problems. In particular, they describe the "pros and cons" of foreign capital's influence in the Canadian economy and prove the obvious preponderance of the latter. An illustration of this can be found in the economic structural flaws resulting from the dominant position of multinational and American monopolies; the suppression of national enterprise; the low effectiveness of processing industry enterprises owned by Canadian firms; the taxpayers' burden--the payment of Canadian interest and dividends to other countries; the eradication of national uniqueness in the way of life and culture; the limitation of political independence. An extremely important conclusion can be drawn from the information presented in this book: In the financial and economic sense, the Canadians are capable of, if not "buying Canada back" from the foreigners, then at least radically weakening national dependence on them.

The negative effects of U.S. monopolies are also examined in other chapters; in particular, the decelerating effect of the United States on the formation of Canada's scientific and technical potential is discussed.

Throughout the work, attention is justifiably focused on the evolution of U.S.-Canadian relations, particularly the qualitatively new stage they entered in the 1970's, under the Liberal Party government headed by P. E. Trudeau. In connection with this, the authors analyze the attempts at more independent national economic and political development in contrast to the process of more intensive economic and political North American "integration."

The authors, however, do not reduce all of Canadian life to this nation's relations with its southern neighbor. Canada has many of its own political and economic problems, which have "national" roots, although they are naturally influenced by the United States as well. The main one is a domestic Canadian problem of long standing--the inferior economic and political status of the French-Canadians. The authors disclose the external and internal political, economic and geographic causes of regional disparities in Canadian development.

The study reveals several interesting features of the development of Canada's vast northern territories--the important role of the state in this process, the priority assigned to the development of the production infrastructure, the search for ways of solving the problem of manpower supply, etc.

Other aspects of Canada's domestic politics and economics are also examined in the work. The authors discuss the signs of crisis within the two-party political machinery of bourgeois Canada and describe the important role of the Communist Party. One of the main distinctive features of the Canadian domestic political scene in the 1970's was the rapid growth of trade unions. But the absence of concerted action by these unions, as the book testifies, will impede the working class' evolution into a moving force in the political and economic struggle.

The authors have examined many aspects of national life, testifying that Canada has not "escaped" the social, political and economic problems and contradictions characteristic of all or most of the developed capitalist countries at the present time. These include inflation, the growing strike movement, anti-labor government measures, broader measures of state economic regulation, attempts to relieve tension in the social sphere by means of government intervention in the area of business revenues, etc.

Special mention should be made of the methodological merits of the study. The book deals with the present day, but it also discloses the historical roots of many phenomena and processes.

Technology and U.S. Military Aims

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 80
pp 115-116

[Review by B. I. Vladimirov of the book "Opasnaya stavka. Nauchno-tekhnicheskaya revolyutsiya i voyennyye prigotovleniya SSHA" (Dangerous Gamble. The Technological Revolution and U.S. Military Preparations) by V. V. Borisov, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1979, 200 pages]

[Text] This book contains an interesting and original analysis of the ways in which U.S. ruling circles are using the technological revolution in specific areas of American armed forces construction and reveals the actual goals being pursued by the military-industrial complex in its speculation on an uncontrolled arms race.

The author conclusively proves that the rapid development of science and technology in recent years has not solved, and cannot solve--due to the very nature of state-monopoly capitalism--social conflicts within the United States, has not maintained the desired status quo in parts of the world where quite recent undivided U.S. political supremacy guaranteed the American monopolies superprofits, and has not breathed new life in capitalism's decrepit socioeconomic system. The author also proves that the present growing dependence of technological development on state policy has created quite concrete prerequisites for vigorous action by the U.S. Government to redirect basic scientific research from military into civilian fields.

The book is full of interesting factual material about the system for the management of U.S. military preparations, the mechanism which guarantees profits from the arms trade and the operations of the military-industrial complex, and the effect of new military equipment on troop organization.

Borisov's work is not only a serious study of the way in which technological achievements are being used in U.S. military construction, but also an excellent reference work on the U.S. Armed Forces and Pentagon doctrines and theories. The book contains, for example, a detailed analysis of the Pentagon's present plans to rearm ground forces, modernize the air force and build up naval strength, a discussion of problems in U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force recruitment, and a description of the methods used by Washington to prepare people ideologically for war. New systems of U.S. weapons are described in terms comprehensible to a broad segment of the reading public.

The main conclusion of the study is that the mechanism of technological progress, even in the capitalist countries, does not contain any elements which make its use for military purposes inevitable. "The development of science and technology can be controlled and managed. The 'technical demon' does not exist, just as the fatal inevitability of a new world war does not exist" (p 199).

American and Soviet Labor Unions

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 80
pp 116-117

[Review by Ye. P. Kassirova of the book "A Comparison of Trade Unions in the USSR and USA" by George Morris, Moscow, Profizdat, 1979, 174 pages]

[Text] This new book by well-known American writer and journalist G. Morris deals with the role and activity of trade unions in the two countries. It is a book about the status and rights of the working class, living and working in diametrically opposed social systems.

Morris' work is of exceeding topical interest. Imperialist propaganda conceals the truth about the USSR and sows the seeds of suspicion, hostility and misinformation in regard to Soviet life, trade unions and the Soviet people in general. The flagrant lies of bourgeois propaganda, particularly those fueling the slanderous anti-Soviet campaign in defense of "human rights," are solemnly repeated by opponents of the policy of detente and peaceful coexistence for the purpose of returning to the cold war and to the escalation of international tension.

The author's close to 50 years of experience in the struggle for working class interests, his thorough knowledge of the problems of the American labor movement and his familiarity with Soviet life (Morris spent a number of years in the USSR as a correspondent for the DAILY WORLD newspaper) make this book vivid and convincing.

Exposing the demagogic statements of the American reactionary labor bureaucracy about the lack of "independence" in Soviet trade unions, Morris proves that it is precisely the United States that does not have a free and independent labor movement, as it has been futilely described by the leadership of the AFL-CIO, particularly by its former chairman G. Meany.

Logically and on the basis of numerous facts and examples, the author proves that Soviet trade unions are vastly superior to the American ones in terms of the democratic principles of their management, the number of members taking an active part in their work, the importance of the role they play in elections to positions of authority, and the incomparably greater variety of obligations they have assumed in all spheres of public life. The "free" trade unions in capitalist America, G. Morris says, do not have these rights and powers.

The author stresses that, in contrast to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, where the progressive character of legislation in any field is constantly being updated and the rights of workers and their unions are constantly being broadened, the United States, just as every other capitalist country, is a place where progressive laws resulting from persistent struggle by workers can be nullified. The validity of the judicial rights of workers depends on the strength and determination of these workers (p 29).

Morris thoroughly analyzes the entire group of problems connected with public well-being in the socialist and capitalist societies, socioeconomic living and working conditions and the rights of the laboring public in the USSR and United States. In his discussion of the standard of living and quality of life of workers in the two different worlds, the author analyzes their qualitative parameters, rejecting the method of abstract and purely quantitative, mechanical comparisons of various indicators of well-being (a favorite strategy of bourgeois propaganda).

In a comparative analysis of the rights of workers and trade unions in the USSR and the United States, the author discusses the attitude of the latter toward problems which now concern all of mankind--war and peace--and conclusively exposes the labor bureaucrats who, in contrast to progressive American unions and contrary to the sentiments of the rank-and-file members of their own associations, are trying to undermine the policy of peace and detente. In a nation where many social problems have not been solved, and where a law on a national health care system has still not been passed, the tax burden is immense. In a nation where 25.8 million people are living in poverty, the government, G. Morris says, is increasing military appropriations to the detriment of public vital necessities.

Morris also stresses the militant nature of the American working class and union members in the struggle for their own socioeconomic interests; he points out such positive tendencies as the ever-wider gap between the policy of the top bureaucrats and the demands of union members for the modification of this policy. The major weakness of the broad masses of workers and union members, however, is, as the author points out, their noninvolvement in the struggle for peace and the cessation of the arms race (p 165), without which the struggle for economic interests and a better future for the nation is hopeless.

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Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 80
pp 118-119

[Article by V. A. Savel'yev]

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MILITARY INTERVENTION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

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